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THE RATIONALITY AND ENFORCEABILITY
OF CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS
ON DIVORCE
THEODORE F. HAASt
Almost all states now allow unilateral no-fault divorce. Most states
also enforce antenuptial agreements in varying forms. In this Article
Professor Haas juxtaposes these two trends and examines an unusual
kind of antenuptial agreement: the contract not to divorce. He offers a
Model Agreement proposing such an arrangement and then analyzes
such contracts under constitutional and contract law principles. The Ar-
ticle concludes with a discussion of the implications for child custody
determinations under such agreements.
In 1951, a Tennessee couple with an "unusually turbulent" marital history
were about to marry one another for the third time, but prior to doing so, they
entered into an antenuptial agreement.1 It provided that "[s]hould either party
file a divorce against the other, then the party so filing shall by such filing forfeit
to the other all right, title, and interest in all the property, real, personal or
mixed, jointly held and owned by them."' 2 If the agreeement was really meant to
dampen their fondness for periodic judicial purges, it was not a success. Within
a couple of years, Mr. Sanders was in court seeking to have the agreement de-
clared void as against public policy.3
Although a failure in the Sanders' case, the Sanders' agreeement is based on
an idea that is worth exploring for both its practical and theoretical interest in
the present age of liberal divorce laws and greater contractual freedom for mar-
ried couples.4 Something like the Sanders' agreement may be attractive to
couples who are not already adept in the marital martial arts and who genuinely
wish at the time they marry to strengthen their marriages by providing them-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1968, Bos-
ton College; Ph.D. 1978, Stanford University; J.D. 1980 Yale University.
1. Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20, 33, 288 S.W.2d 473, 478-79 (1956).
2. Id. at 24, 288 S.W.2d at 475.
3. Id. at 22, 288 S.W.2d at 474.
4. See generally UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (permitting divorce planning
in such agreements). Contractual restrictions on divorce have been employed or attempted in other
cultures allowing easy divorce. The institution of the ketubbah in Jewish marriage law was an at-
tempt to deter husbands from divorcing their wives by making the cost of divorce prohibitive.
Greenstone, Ketubah (or Ketubbah)-Legal, in 7 JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 472 (1904). For a contem-
porary American use of the ketubbah in this regard, see In re Marriage of Noghrey, 169 Cal. App.
3d 326, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985). The court denied enforcement of the agreement because it was
the wife who sought the divorce and, far from deterring her from seeking a divorce, the agreement
encouraged her to obtain one with "all deliberate speed." Id. at 331, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
Under Roman law, agreements not to divorce or agreements providing for penalties upon di-
vorce were invalid. ALEX. C. 8.38.2; M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 24.7 (R. Dannenbring
trans. 2d ed. 1968).
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selves with legal deterrents to the risk of a pure unilateral no-fault divorce.5
This Article explores the reinstitution of a restrictive divorce regime by
contract. The Article addresses the following questions: Is it rational to restrict
one's freedom to divorce? What should the terms of the agreement be? Would
such an agreement be legally enforceable or is the legal protection of individual
freedom to marry and divorce so strong that such an agreement would be void
as a matter of either constitutional or contract law?
Traditionally the law of marriage and divorce was doubly restrictive. First,
it restricted the entrance into and the exit from marriage. 6 Second, the law re-
stricted the parties' ability to alter the restrictive state regime through private
agreement. 7 That traditional regime has been deeply eroded by two liberalizing
trends. First, not only are there fewer marital restrictions, 8 but all states have
enacted no-fault divorce laws.9 Second, states do not so jealously guard the law
of marriage and divorce: private ordering of the incidents of marriage and di-
vorce, by antenuptial, postnuptial, or separation agreements are becoming
widely recognized.10 Indeed, contracts in lieu of marriage are enforceable in
many states.11
Private ordering of marital and postmarital relationships generally has been
accepted with respect to certain incidents of those relationships-ownership of
property and, to a lesser extent, support. 12 However, divorce itself-the change
5. By a pure unilateral no-fault divorce, I refer to one that neither is mutually agreed to by the
spouses nor could be unilaterally obtained on fault grounds.
6. On traditional marriage restrictions, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 11.1 (1968) (discussing restrictive traditional divorce law), and M. GLEN-
DON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE 24-25 (1977) (noting traditional constraints based on family authority and the
public interest).
7. 15 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1741, at 63 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1972).
8. See M. GLENDON, supra note 6, at 25. The United States Supreme Court has declared
various marital restrictions unconstitutional. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (marriage by
prisoners); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage by persons with unmet support obli-
gations); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriages).
9. In 1985 South Dakota became the last state to enact a no-fault divorce statute. 1 I Fain. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1274 (Apr. 9, 1985). See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 6, at 235 (marriage in-
creasingly terminable at will and divorce proceedings "increasingly being seen as the mere formali-
ties they are").
10. L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE LAW 347
(1981); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L, REV.
204, 280, 285 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 136-53.
11. E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (recogniz-
ing various theories, including contract, on which property and support rights may be founded upon
termination of unmarried cohabitation). See generally Annotation, Property Rights Arising from Re-
lationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3 A.L.R.4TH 13 (198 1) ("nonmarital cohabitation
has become both increasingly prevalent and increasingly recognized as a theoretically defensible
lifestyle, and the law can thus no longer plausibly ignore these relationships").
12. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to Validity of Premarital Agreements
Contemplating Divorce or Separation, 53 A.L.R.4TH 22 (1987) (discussing cases dealing with "the
question whether premarital agreements setting the terms for maintenance, maintenance pending
divorce, or property division in the event of divorce or separation, are void as a class."). Although
some states do not permit an antenuptial agreement to control the matter of spousal support, In re
Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Iowa), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979); Duncan v.
Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), the trend is definitely in favor of permitting the
agreement to control this matter. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734 (Colo. 1982) (en
bane) ("There is no statutory proscription against contracting for maintenance in the antenuptial
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of marital status-has remained a matter of public rather than private order-
ing. 13 But it is just the issue of the private ordering of marital status that I wish
to explore: whether spouses can contractually limit, directly or indirectly, their
right to a divorce.
This question brings the two liberalizing trends of family law, which have
appeared to run parallel, into conflict. The weakening of state restrictions on
divorce and on the private ordering of marital and postmarital relationships has
tended to diminish the legal obligations of marriage. But the new contractual
freedom can be used to counteract the new freedom to divorce. Not everyone is
pleased with the general liberalizing trend,14 and there are reasons why a person
would desire a marriage that is legally indissoluble or dissoluble only on fault
grounds. Some are pecuniary. Under the laws of inheritance a spouse has rights
that are lost upon divorce.1 5 Upon divorce, complementarity and economies of
scale are lost and remain uncompensated in the division of property.1 6 Disin-
vestment in one's career or other paid work for the sake of maximizing family
welfare entails a risk that at the time of divorce is often borne individually rather
than spread over both spouses. t7 Further, a person may want to impede the
dissolubility of marriage because he desires, for social or religious reasons, to
agreement."); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985) (antenuptial agreements that "estab-
lish property settlements and support obligations at the time of divorce are presumptively valid").
An exception is made even in those states permitting the agreement to control, however, when fail-
ure to award support would result in one of the spouses' becoming a public charge. Osborne v.
Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 599, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981). An agreement that adversely affects the
support rights of the parties' children will not control that matter. In re Marriage of Ayo, 190 Cal.
App. 3d 442, 451-52, 235 Cal. Rptr. 458, 463 (1987); Miesen v. Frank, 361 Pa. Super. 204, 209-10,
522 A.2d 85, 87-88 (1987).
13. There is no readily discernible trend either toward the reinstitution of common law mar-
riage or toward the institution of common law divorce. By common law divorce, I refer simply to
divorce by mutual agreement with no required judicial or other governmental action. Although
such a method of divorcing is unknown to Anglo-American law, it can be found in other legal
cultures. The Soviet Union has at times permitted divorce either by one of the spouses unilaterally
or by mutual agreement. Gray, Scholarship on Soviet Family Law in Perspective, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
236, 246 (1970); Gsovski, Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Law, 35 GEO. L.J. 209, 209 (1947). Islamic
nations permit divorce by the husband's announcement that he is thereby divorcing his wife. Some
nations require that the statement be made to a government official; others do not. Chaudry v.
Chaudry, 159 N.J. Super. 566, 388 A.2d 1000, cert. denied, 78 N.J. 335, 395 A.2d 204 (1978); Pearl,
Recognition of the Talaq; Some Recent Cases, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 49, 49 (1984).
14. See G. GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE (1986). One commentator has suggested,
The new [no-fault divorce] law reflected and reinforced the movement for feminine equal-
ity and independence. But it retreated from the idea that our law should have special
concern for institutions with the historic function of making males responsible for their
families; and for creating units within which, between spouses and among parents and
children, a principle of open-ended obligation prevails. The result is an impoverished
moral order.
Selznick, The Idea ofa Communitarian Morality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 452 (1987).
15. Unlike alimony, this right may be lost even in an ex parte divorce obtained in a state that
lacks in personam jurisdiction over the divorced spouse. Compare Simons v. Miami Beach First
Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965) (extinction of dower rights by exparte foreign divorce) with Vander-
bilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (support rights not extinguished by ex parte foreign divorce).
16. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 60-61 (1985); Espenshade, The Economic
Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 615, 620 (1979). For a judicial statement of the
position that division of the couple's property fairly compensates each spouse for dissolution of the
marriage, see Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho 10, 12-22, 557 P.2d 604, 606-16 (1976) (Shepard, J.,
dissenting).
17. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 16, at 184-89.
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preserve his status as a married person 8 or, more generally, to preserve at least
a societal remnant governed by "traditional family values." 19 Perhaps most im-
portant, parents or prospective parents may wish to limit the risk of becoming a
noncustodial parent.20
In a simpler time it may have taken the direct experience of marital discord
to raise contractual divorce deterrents to consciousness, but in a more enlight-
ened era such as our own, in which the Sanders' hard-won knowledge is com-
monplace, one knows that one cannot escape choice. Today ignorance of the
risks of divorce must be willful. Entering into a marriage that either spouse can
unilaterally dissolve is no more romantic than entering into one that can be
dissolved only upon mutual agreement or showing of marital fault.
This Article is divided into four parts. In Part I, I explore the foundations,
and especially the rational foundation, of agreements to restrict the right of di-
vorce. In Part II, I expound an agreement that is responsive to the concerns
noted above. The divorce restrictions in this agreement consist of barring unilat-
eral no-fault divorce and/or burdening it by disfavoring a spouse who obtains a
unilateral no-fault divorce in determining property, spousal support, and cus-
tody rights. In Part III, I examine the constitutionality of such restrictions, and
in Part IV, I examine such restrictions in light of contract law. I conclude that
such restrictions are rational even for a person committed to maximizing her
individual welfare; that they are constitutional; and that they are valid under
contract law, although I recognize that the validity of a bar to divorce and the
validity of determining custody rights based on whether a spouse obtains a uni-
lateral no-fault divorce are more problematic than the validity of determining
property and spousal support rights on that basis.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE DECISION TO RESTRICT DIVORCE
A person's decision to restrict his right to divorce may be made along two
distinct lines of thought. One is communitarian and maintains either that the
community authoritatively commands a restrictive divorce regime or that, in
18. Sharma v. Sharma, 8 Kan. App. 2d 726, 727, 667 P.2d 395, 395 (1983) (Indian woman
informed court that the spouses' "Hindu religion does not recognize divorce, and that if she returns
to India as a divorced woman, her family and friends will treat her as though she were dead");
Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 1401, 1402 (Okla. 1975) (wife contended court lacked authority to
grant divorce on grounds of incompatibility because divorce "contravenes ... the authority of God,
the Bible and Jesus Christ"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 901 (1976).
19. See R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); G. GILDER, supra note
14. As a symptom of societal dissolution, marital dissolution is positively correlated to the risk of
suicide. Stack, The Effects of Marital Dissolution on Suicide, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 83 (1980);
Wasserman, A Longitudinal Analysis of the Linkage Between Suicide, Unemployment, and Marital
Dissolution, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 853 (1984).
20. See G. GREIF, SINGLE FATHERS (1985); T. OAKLAND, DIVORCED FATHERS: RECON-
STRUCTING A QUALITY LIFE 111 (1984) (noting loss of child to father as cost of divorce); M. Ro-
MAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY (1978); G.
SILVER & M. SILVER, WEEKEND FATHERS 3 (1981) ("Men are no longer content to quietly leave
the house that has been home to them for many years. They are no longer content to become
Weekend Fathers or ex-parents by judicial decree. They are no longer content to be mere money
machines.").
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any event, the community is better off if the individuals in it bind themselves to a
restrictive marital regime.21 This line of thought may rest on religious or secular
grounds. Some may feel bound by church teachings not to divorce even when
they believe they would be happier in purely secular terms if they did.22 Others
may feel bound by a nonreligious morality not to divorce simply because they
have promised to take their spouses until death, whatever life's vicissitudes.
Others may feel that their own individual welfare should be subordinated to the
welfare of the community, and that divorce is a significant cause of a more gen-
eral social disintegration.2 3 Of course, an individual may act under a combina-
tion of these influences. If one believes that the community commands or is
better off under a restrictive divorce regime, instituting that belief either through
general legislation or, as a second best, through legally binding contract becomes
an attractive option.
Another line of thought appeals not to communitarian virtue but to enlight-
ened self-interest. I refer to the ethical view that takes enlightened self-interest
as its goal as individualistic utilitarianism. For an individualistic utilitarian, ra-
tional choice consists in the maximization of her utility function of goods, serv-
ices, and activities; that is to say, she attempts to derive the greatest satisfaction
she can from her life.24
The institution of marriage, like much else in American culture, is perme-
ated by individualistic utilitarianism. 25 Indeed, it is the intellectual foundation of
21. [Tlhough in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of
matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals; yet it must be
carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indis-
solubility... In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be
sacrificed to the greater and more general good.
Evans v. Evans, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 467 (1790); see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)
(legislative control of marriage justified by the importance of marriage to "the morals and civiliza-
tion of a people").
22. See, eg., Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Casti Connubii (December 31, 1930), in OFFICAL CATH-
OLIC TEACHINGS: LOVE AND SEXUALrrY 23, 25 (0. Liebard ed. 1978) ("mhe nature of matrimony
is entirely independent of the free will of man, so that if one has once contracted matrimony he is
thereby subject to its divinely made laws and its essential properties.").
23. See supra note 21.
24. Smart, Utilitarianism, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206, 207 (P. Edwards ed.
1967). This position provides the foundation for the modem application of economics to human
behavior not limited to the allocation of material goods to satisfy material wants. For the applica-
tion of this approach to marriage and the family, see G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY
(1981); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, ch. 5 (3d ed. 1986); Levinger, A Social Psycho-
logical Perspective on Marital Dissolution, 32:1 J. Soc. ISSUES 21 (1976).
25. Traditional utilitarianism aims at the greatest happiness for the greatest number, that is, it
aims at maximizing the societal well-being. Smart, supra note 24, at 207-08. Individualistic, or
egoistic, utilitarianism aims at the greatest happiness of the subject. Id. at 207. While individualistic
utilitarianism may seem like an unnecessarily laborious way of saying egoism or selfishness, those
terms have negative connotations, whereas the theory and practice of individualistic utilitarianism
views purposive maximization of the subject's own well-being either as good or as morally neutral.
The subject views herself as having a duty to herself to maximize her own happiness. A recent
popular study suggests the pervasiveness of this ethos in American culture. See generally R. BEL-
LAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, supra note 19 (reversing the order of
the words and calling it utilitarian individualism, to distinguish it from expressive individualism).
See also J. UDRY, THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MARRIAGE 474 (3d ed. 1974) ("In the past hundred
years, Americans have redefined the nature of marriage . . . as an arrangement of mutual
gratification.")
1988]
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modem liberal divorce laws, in that such laws are based on the view that persons
should not be "trapped" in "dead marriages," but should remain free to maxi-
mize individual utility either by going it alone or by forming a new marital part-
nership. It is my contention that even under an ethical premise of individualistic
utilitarianism, restricting the right to divorce is a rational choice. Because such
a contention seems paradoxical, it is necessary to explore this line of justification
at greater length than the line that appeals to communitarian virtue.
The rationality of marriage under modem legal rules is an instance of the
more general.case of the rationality of cooperative ventures. 26 Individualistic
utilitarianism does not consider group loyalty either good in itself or as a privi-
leged instrumental good.27 The cooperative venture or partnership is a rational
choice for an individualistic utilitarian because it is a means of enhancing the
utility of the individual members. It is, however, at least apparently rational for
each member of the partnership to continue to look to her own utility function.
Thus, the partnership's continuation depends on its net benefits to each member
continuing to exceed the net benefits of her alternatives.
The individualistic utilitarian model of the marital partnership states that a
person marries when she believes that she has discovered her best realistic alter-
native and that she divorces when she believes she has a more attractive realistic
alternative. 28 Although both the marriage decision and the divorce decision are
based on the selection of the best realistic alternative, there is a major structural
difference between the two. The marriage decision must be bilateral in that it
requires the agreement of the prospective spouse; however, the divorce decision,
under modem American law, can be unilateral. Thus, if one partner has a supe-
rior opportunity, taking into account the costs to her-psychic as well as mone-
tary-of dissolving the present marriage, 29 she may unilaterally dissolve the
marriage even if the other may be worse off as a result of the dissolution.
The tension between cooperation and selfishness that exists for the members
of partnerships can be set out in a matrix of outcomes of different behaviors in
different contexts. 30 Each partner has a choice of behaviors: he may be either
26. See D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS
(1984); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
27. Sen & Williams, Introduction, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 5-6 (A. Sen & B. Williams
eds. 1982).
28. To call something the best realistic alternative implies the existence of both opportunity
costs and transaction costs. Every noncoerced decision to marry has alternatives: to marry another
person; to continue one's search for a spouse; not to marry. The opportunity cost of any choice is
the perceived value of the most attractive foregone alternative. The decision is realistic in two re-
spects. First, marriage requires the consent of the person whom one has decided to marry. Second,
the decision is realistic in that the decisionmaker decides that continuing the search for an even
better spouse should not be worth the cost of the search given the likelihood of success. In other
words, the decisionmaker may acknowledge that more attractive spousal candidates exist somewhere
out there but decide that the cost of finding them-the transaction cost-is simply not worth the
expected difference in value between the known attractive candidate and the unknown more attrac-
tive candidates. The use of the term "realistic" is not meant to imply that the decision is a wise one
or even a deeply considered one.
29. Levinger, supra note 24, at 25-27, 36-40 (discussing material, symbolic and aftectional bar-
riers to divorce).
30. See D. GAUTHIER, supra note 26, at 79-82; D. PARFIT, supra note 26, at 55-62.
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cooperative or selfish. To be selfish is simply to seek maximization of one's own
welfare without concern for the welfare of anyone else. To be cooperative is to
seek the maximization of group welfare-that is, the sum of the members' wel-
fare-even though another act would maximize one's own interest, at least in
the short run. For each partner, her partner's behavior provides the context of
her own behavior, with the following outcomes, ranked in descending order of
preference from one to four:
Figure A
B's STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES
SELFISH COOPERATIVE
3 4
A's
STRATEGIES SELFISH 3 1
AND
OUCMS COOPERATIVE 41 2: 2
4 2 j
If both partners are cooperative (lower right cell), each has a higher out-
come than if both are selfish (upper left cell). Each has her second best outcome
rather than her third best. Cooperation generates more utility-a larger pie-to
be distributed among the members of the partnership.3 1 As long as the distribu-
tion is not so skewed as to leave one partner worse off than if she had gone it
alone, it is rational for each partner to prefer cooperation to selfishness. How-
ever, if one partner is selfish and the other cooperative, the selfish partner will be
even better off than under either mutual selfishness or mutual cooperation (lower
left or upper right cells). She is better off because she benefits from the larger pie
created by the other's cooperative behavior, and because she appropriates more
of that pie for her own benefit. The cooperative partner is worse off than under a
regime of mutual cooperation because her share in the benefits of cooperation is
less. She may be even worse off than under a regime of mutual selfishness be-
cause her efforts could be focused on maximizing her own utility, but are instead
directed toward improving the other's utility.
The best world for the individualistic utilitarian, then, is one in which she is
the only selfish person among cooperative persons (lower left or upper right
cells). But if the other members of the world are also rational-that is, maxi-
mizers of individual utility-they are going to prefer a selfish world (upper left)
in which each will have a third-best outcome to a world in which they are coop-
31. D. GAUTHIER, supra note 26, at 274; J. RAwLS, supra note 26, at 4.
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erative but their partners are selfish because then their outcome is the fourth
best.
Of course, this analysis is repulsively cold-blooded and apparently psycho-
logically unrealistic in the context of marriage. People marry because they love
one another and desire to enhance the welfare of the other rather than simply a
desire to use the other as an instrument to enhance their own welfare. Thus, a
more attractive and apparently more realistic matrix of outcomes is the
following:
Figure B
B's STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES
SELFISH COOPERATIVE
2 3 or 4
A's
STRATEGIES SELFISH 2 3 or 4
AND
OUTCOMES COOPERATIVE 3or 4 1
3 or 4 1
This matrix represents the positions of persons who love one another. For
such persons, mutual cooperation (lower right) is the best outcome since they
receive satisfaction not only from their own welfare but from the other's welfare
also. As a distant second best, such persons would probably prefer a world of
mutual selfishness (upper left) because at least neither would be taking advan-
tage of the other. If, however, their behavior was not to be similar, but one was
to be selfish and the other cooperative (lower left or upper right), it is difficult to
determine which outcome would be preferable. Each might prefer to be the
cooperative partner even though she was being taken advantage of by the other's
selfishness because she would prefer not to betray the ideal of cooperation. On
the other hand, she might decide that if someone was going to be taken advan-
tage of, it was not going to be her. Therefore, she would prefer to be the selfish
partner.
Having acknowledged the psychological truth of the second matrix, I want
to return to the first because the prospective spouse actually confronts both mat-
rices. The love that a prospective spouse feels for the other does not obliterate
his own self-interest or his awareness of the mutability of all things, intimate
relationships among them. The decision to marry under modem divorce rules is
thus fraught with a tension that is captured in the dissonance of the two
matrices.
The prospective spouse desires the well-being of the other for the other's
[Vol. 66
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sake and not simply as an instrument of enhancing her own well-being; however,
insofar as she is generally informed about human nature, she is aware that peo-
ple are not entirely or constantly altruistic. She is also aware that creating a
family is a project that involves more than the expression of mutual affection.
Family projects, more specifically the rearing of children, may have a negative
effect on the interspousal relationship insofar as they leave less time and energy
for directly nurturing that relationship. 32 Moreover, spouses are likely to en-
counter role strain: the demands of their careers or jobs are in competition with
their interpersonal needs and their roles as parents and domestic laborers.33
The rational person, then, more or less aware of all that has been discussed
in the preceding paragraph, incorporates the first matrix into her decision mak-
ing even though the second is her vision of the happy life. Some of the conse-
quences of certain important decisions-whether to have children, how to
integrate career or job and family- are independent of continuing affection be-
tween the spouses. Whether or not the spouse§ remain affectionate, the children
will remain and family-influenced career or job decisions will have a lasting ef-
fect. The rational person will want to assess the risks associated with those long-
term investments.
Two important applications of the first matrix occur in the context of mar-
riage and divorce: one is the rationality of the division of labor between spouses;
the other is the rationality of having children. For illustrative purposes, I will
discuss the second here at some length. Insofar as each prospective spouse is
rational and cognizant of the risk of marriage dissolution, she perceives as a real
possiblity that a time will come when either spouse may want to live with the
children but apart from the other parent. Thus, each will say to herself, "I know
that you are in love with A and that he is in love with you, but you have to face
the fact that there are many other couples who have felt just the way you two do
about one another, and then one partner has become dissatisfied with the mar-
riage and has ended it. Assuming you become dissatisfied with your marriage at
a time when you have children, what will you do about them? Will you have
custody, or will he, or will you remain together so that you both can have cus-
tody? For each of us the best result may be to live with the children and apart
from the other parent and the worst result to live apart from the children."
This result is shown in the upper right and lower left cells of the first ma-
trix. One spouse has appropriated the fruits of the couple's cooperative ven-
ture-she is the one who continues to have daily contact with the children. The
other spouse continues to cooperate in paying child support, even if unwillingly,
but is left without significant contact with the children. If there is a real possib-
lity of the worst result, it is rational to seek means to avoid it.
32. Campbell, The American Way of Mating: Marriage S4 Children Only Maybe, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, May 1975, at 37, 39 ("Almost as soon as a couple has kids, their happy bubble bursts. For
both men and women, reports of happiness and satisfaction drop .... , not to rise again significantly
until their children are grown and about to leave the nest."); Levinger, supra note 24, at 40.
33. Hunt & Hunt, The Duality of Careers and Familiar New Integrations or New Polarizations,
29 Soc. PROBS. 499 (1982); Moen & Dempster-McClain, Employed Parent=" Role Strain, Work
Time and Preferences for Working Less, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 579 (1987).
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One rational solution is not to have children. The cost of that solution is
obvious. Another rational solution is to agree to remain a unit so that each
parent can continue to have daily contact with the children, even when one par-
ent would prefer to live apart from the other. Many prospective parents would
agree that this solution is preferable to one in which they do not have children.34
The problem presented to such persons by modem divorce law is that it
fails to protect their decision to cooperate. Because either spouse can unilaterally
obtain a no-fault divorce and possibly obtain custody of the children, the spouses
may find themselves in the upper right or lower left cells of the first matrix. It is,
therefore, rational for the spouses to protect their decision to cooperate by con-
tracting out of the state's regime and into one that deters an attempt to move
from the lower right to the upper right or lower left cells.
Arguably it is rational to risk the worst outcome (lower left or upper right
cells) in order to have children at all or on the belief that the general high inci-
dence of divorce does not apply to one's own relationship because characteristics
of oneself and one's spouse give the relationship a much higher probability of
permanence. But it is irrational to run the risk if it can be eliminated. Of course,
the risk cannot be eliminated without cost. For example, by entering into a
legally enforceable cooperative agreement one thereby expresses a doubt that she
can rely on mutual affection, trust, and altruism to ensure cooperative behavior.
The risk then is that the doubt undermines the mutual affection, trust, and altru-
ism that do exist and would have continued to exist but for the expressed doubt.
That is an untleniable risk of such an agreement, but it does not seem a disposi-
tive one. It would be up to the prospective spouse to decide whether that risk
outweighed the risk of not having the agreement.
To summarize, unless each partner can count on the other's cooperation,
rational persons will choose a world in which everyone is selfish, even though
they recognize that there exists the possiblity of a cooperative world that is bet-
ter for everyone, including themselves. Assuming the potential partners prefer a
cooperative world; they are faced with the problem of providing sufficient pro-
tection against selfish betrayals of the cooperative world, so that a partnership
may form and flourish.
I have focused on the problem of child custody to illustrate the application
of the model of rational choice under an ethos of individualistic utilitarianism.
Risks of substantial investment in a marital partnership under a unilateral no-
fault divorce regime can be stated more generally, however. First, some of the
value of the marital partnership is simply lost when the partnership dissolves.35
The individuals no longer have the benefits, tangible and intangible, of coopera-
tion. Second, some values produced during the marriage are not liquid, such as
children, human capital, and foregone opportunities to invest in human capital.
34. Of course, it is not necessary that they agree. For some, the prospect of having to live with
someone when preferring not to do so will outweigh not having children. In this case, the second best
choice is in the upper left cell rather than the lower right. But for many, the increased wealth
brought about by cooperation (viz., the children) will outweigh the loss of autonomy. For such
persons, the first matrix represents their set of preferences.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 172-74.
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Third, the liquid value of the marital partnership may not be sufficient to take
into account disparities in the distribution of nonliquid assets, or it may be di-
vided in a manner that underestimates inequities in the distribution of nonliquid
assets.36 For example, the spouse who does not obtain custody, instead of being
compensated for that loss, is typically required to contribute substantially to the
support of a household of which she is not a part.
To compound these problems, the fragility of marital partnerships under a
unilateral no-fault divorce regime can easily be internalized. Thus the spouses
act on the assumption that marriage is fragile, and because of those actions their
marriage is more likely to be fragile. In other words, belief in fragility is a self-
fulfilling prophecy. For example, in A Treatise on the Family, Gary Becker
notes that marriages between persons of different religions or races are more
likely to end in divorce, in part because the spouses expect them to be more
likely to end in divorce. 37 If allegiance is tentative, there will be a restraint on
investment. Because of the lower investment, the relationship is less valuable.
Moreover, if the energy that would have been invested in the relationship is
invested elsewhere, the opportunity cost of the marital relationship increases,
thereby further increasing the probability of dissolution.
In sum, as a result of the protection afforded individual liberty by modern
no-fault divorce, some spouses are in a worse position than they would have
been under the more restrictive fault regime.38 Furthermore, some families are
in a worse position because of the new regime.39 It is even arguable that the
society as a whole is in a worse position under the new regime.4°
Unilateral divorce may involve both a loss in value among the group of
persons affected, and an inequitable distribution of the costs of divorce. Even
assuming that there is a net gain to the divorcing spouse from the dissolution,
the positions of divorced spouse and the children may worsen to an extent that
more than offsets the gains of the divorcing spouse.4 1 Further, even the divorc-
36. L. WErrZMAN, supra note 16, at 184-214.
37. G. BECKER, supra note 24, at 224-25.
38. In economic terms, the move from a restrictive divorce law to one permitting pure unilat-
eral no-fault divorce was not Pareto-superior. A Pareto-superior move is one in which no one is
made worse off by the move and at least one person is made better off. R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND
MAMcETS 174 (3d ed. 1978) ("Pareto criterion"). Assuming there are no children, divorce is Pareto-
superior when neither spouse is worse off because of the divorce. It is not Pareto-superior if one
spouse is worse off, even if the other spouse is much better off.
39. Again, in economic terms, some divorces do not even exhibit Kaldor-I-Iicks efficiency.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency refers to the idea that the gain from the move offsets the loss. R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91 (1983). Assuming there are no children, a divorce is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient only if one spouse was made much better off even though the other spouse was slightly
worse off. The former's gains would more than offset the latter's loss. A move that is Kaldor-Hiecks
efficient need not be Pareto-superior. See supra note 38.
40. See G. GILDER, supra note 14, at 16-17 ("The sense of social vitality and balance does not
'just happen.' In civilized conditions it is love, marriage, and the nurture of children that project a
society into the future and make it responsible for posterity."); D. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NA-
TION 190-94 (1986) (suggesting causal relation between erosion of family and disintegration of larger
society); Selznick, supra note 14, at 452.
41. Certain studies show a precipitous decline in the standard of living of divorced women with
custody of children which persists as long as these women remain unmarried. Weiss, The Impact of
Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-Parent Households, 46 J. MARRIAGE &
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ing spouse may be in a worse position as a result of wishful thinking: she may
accurately assess the costs and benefits of her present situation but may overesti-
mate the benefits and underestimate the costs of the alternative. 42
The risks discussed above are inherent to entering a cooperative venture,
not specific to the personalities and characters of the prospective partners. We
can therefore assume that rational persons appreciate these risks and will reflect
as follows: "We are contemplating entering into a cooperative venture-mar-
riage. That venture has various risks. Better opportunities may become avail-
able for one or both of us. The venture may not produce the return we now
expect. Perhaps, for example, children are going to be more costly in time and
money and less satisfying than we now think. We are only willing to enter into
such a momentous venture on the condition that it can be terminated only by
mutual consent-in other words, each of us can veto termination-or by a seri-
ous breach of proper spousal behavior, such as abandonment, adultery or cru-
elty. We recognize that either of us may want to end the marriage, and that a
rule of mutual consent or marital fault may frustrate that person's pursuit of
utility maximization. However, we are more concerned about the loss of chil-
dren, or being left without a career (or with an etiolated one), about weakness of
will, overestimation of competing opportunities, and the failure to invest ade-
quately in the partnership because of these other concerns. We do not feel that a
nonbinding commitment is sufficient protection for these risks inherent to the
marital partnership under modem law. Therefore, we wish to bind ourselves to
a rule that says just as entry into marriage is only by mutual consent, so, too,
exit from it is only by mutual consent, excepting of course, where there is mari-
tal fault." That is a rational position for a person to take under an ethic of
individualistic utilitarianism.
FAM. 115, 126 (1984); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1241-51 (1981). I am una-
ware of any studies attempting to discern whether there is a net gain in the sum of the welfare of all
those directly involved in a divorce (i.e., spouses and children) even when the welfare of one or more
of the individuals involved declines. Weitzman does note that both spouses experience a decline in
real income. Weitzman, supra, at 1249. She claims that divorced men's standard of living increases
42% and divorced women's standard of living decreases 73%. Id. at 1251. Simply in monetary
terms, therefore, divorce is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient. See supra note 39.
42. See D. GAuTHIER, supra note 26, at 185. An illustration of this phenomenon can be found
in Carter v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 211 S.E.2d 253 (1975).
The evidence shows that Edwin wished to continue the marriage, that Frances, expecting
to marry another, had sought the divorce, but that after the divorce*[in 1972] Edwin, and
not Frances, had remarried... [In addition, Frances] expected to receive, and did receive, a
Master's degree in School Psychology in order to qualify for a position in the public school
system... The evidence shows that Frances became mentally ill and was hospitalized in
August, 1972... Because of her recurring health problems, Frances was not employed in
public education at the time of the hearing, but was employed in a lower salaried position
as a proof reader for a publishing company.
Id. at 477-78, 211 S.E.2d at 256. The facts expressed by the court do not indicate whether Frances'
mental illness was the result of the failure of her remarriage plans, but let us hypothesize that it was.
When Frances decided to dissolve the marriage, she may have contemplated herself with a new
husband, with a job as a school psychologist, and with custody of the children of her former mar-
riage. She wound up with none of these things. Frances may have had terrible luck, but it is undeni-
able that what occurred was an inherent risk of her decision. What is doubtful is whether Frances
adequately assessed that risk. Such an assessment may have caused her to increase her investment in
her marriage to Edwin rather than to invest herself outside that marriage.
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II. THE CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION
The purpose of an antenuptial agreement responsive to the concerns raised
in the previous section is the conversion of individual self-interest into group
interest. Such a conversion consists of more than a promise to place marriage or
family before self, but rather of mechanisms to channel self-interest so that it
supports rather than undermines group interest. Such an agreement is not a
panacea. Law, contractual or otherwise, is a fairly weak force, and other social
forces are more likely to hold a marriage together.43 The value of the contract is
threefold. First, the agreement raises the consciousness of the participants about
the nature of the act of entering a marital partnership. Second, it allocates mari-
tal goods such as wealth and children in a way that favors the spouse who wishes
to continue the marriage. Third, the agreement may provide enough support for
other cohesive social forces so that at the margin it makes a difference and pre-
serves some marriages in which the total utility to the members is maximized by
continuing rather than dissolving the marriage.
A. Other Kinds of Antenuptial Agreements with Divorce Contingencies
The agreement that I propose is not the only kind of marital agreement that
is divorce-conscious. In the classic antenuptial agreement, the spouses simply
affirm the separateness of their premarital property and provide that each part-
ner's income during the marriage is also separate.44 This agreement blends mar-
riage with unmarried cohabitation in that unmarried cohabitants typically do
not pool their assets and liabilities.4 5 Such an agreement does not make sense
for a marriage in which one of the spouses specializes in unpaid domestic labor
and therefore does not invest in her own income-producing ability. This disin-
vestment need not be total. A person may perform some paid labor and make
some investment in her income-producing ability but still do less than she would
otherwise in order to perform domestic labor.46 For example, a person may
work as an attorney but not go out of town or work in the evening because of
domestic obligations. If both spouses are not equally on call for household du-
ties, then the spouse who bears the major responsibility for such duties is special-
izing in domestic labor. An antenuptial agreement providing that each spouse is
entitled to only his or her own income inequitably ignores the diminished earn-
ings and earning capacity of the spouse specializing in domestic production.47
43. J. EEKELAAR, FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 44 (lst ed. 1978); M. RIHEINSTEIN,
MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIvORCE, AND THE LAW 284 (1972).
44. See, eg., Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Osborne v. Osborne, 384
Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981).
45. P. BLUMSEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 109 (1983).
46. G. BECKER, supra note 24, at 21-32 (discussing division of labor in households and fami-
lies); Berardo, Sheham & Leslie, A Residue of Tradition: Jobs. Careers, and Spouses' Time in House-
work, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 381 (1987); Hunt & Hunt, supra note 33; Moen & Dempster-
McClain, supra note 33, at 588 (in two-earner families, mother typically reduces work schedule
outside home).
47. Two commentators have noted the effect of this on the wife:
Women in the work force thus contended with greater physical and emotional distractions
from their occupations than did their male counterparts. It is clear from the present find-
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Thus the classic, or cohabitation-like, antenuptial agreement is simple but
unresponsive to the complexities of many marriages. When antenuptial agree-
ments are drafted to take account of unpaid domestic labor, however, other diffi-
culties arise. One approach is to avoid domestic specialization; both spouses are
expected to perform equal amounts of domestic labor, and the antenuptial agree-
ment sets forth domestic duties. Although such provisions may be very useful
for spousal negotiations in an ongoing marriage, they are not legally enforcea-
ble,48 nor can women rely on such promises with much confidence. 49
In cases in which the contract anticipates specialization in domestic labor,
the contract may be excessively rigid and one-sided. Consider one of the agree-
ments in Weitzman's The Marriage Contract.50 According to the hypothetical
facts, David is a medical student and Nancy is an aspiring dancer, the kind of
career that cannot be put on hold. Nancy agrees to forego the possibility of that
career to become David's wife. She is to take a job in order to finance his profes-
sional training and thereafter become a full-time housewife and, sometime later,
mother. Their antenuptial agreement is designed to protect Nancy from the risks
she has incurred in not pursuing a career that would presumably give her satis-
faction and income.
The agreement contains the following provisions, among others:
- Nancy will work as a secretary in order to support David
until he has finished medical school and an internship.
- Nancy will not work outside the home after David's career
has commenced.
- Nancy agrees to participate actively in church and country
club activities, to serve on medical auxiliary and hospital benefit com-
mittees, and to socialize with David's colleagues and other physicians.
- Children will be postponed until David's education is
completed.
ings as well that men did not respond to the disadvantaged position of women in the work
force between 1965 and 1975. Indeed, while men decreased their paid.work time during
that period, they devoted the gained time not to domestic work but to leisure activities.
Coverman & Sheley, Change in Men's Housework and Child-Care Time, 1965-1975, 48 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 413, 420 (1986); see also Berardo, Shehan & Leslie, supra note 46 at 388 ("Dual-
career wives while devoting less than half the number of hours that full-time housewives devote ....
still spent nearly three times as many hours doing housework each week as their husbands."); Moen
& Dempster-McClain, supra note 33 at 585 (majority of mothers prefer to work fewer hours in order
to have more time with family; husbands typically want wives to work fewer hours to devote more
time to family).
48. There is a long-standing reluctance on the part of the state to resolve spousal disputes in
ongoing marriages. Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 885 (1959) (child's education);
McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) (amount of support). This reluctance
extends to contracts between the spouses. Lacks v. Lacks, 12 N.Y.2d 268, 189 N.E.2d 487, 238
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1963) (contract to pay spouse certain amount during marriage in lieu of support and
maintenance void); Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29
HARv. L. REv. 485, 492 (1916) (agreement between parents regarding religious education of their
children unenforceable). For criticism of this tradition, see Schultz, supra note 10, at 319-28.
49. See eg., Moen & Dempster-McClain, supra note 33, at 585; Berardo, Shehan & Leslie,
supra note 46, at 390.
50.- L. WErrzmAN, supra note 10, at 295-99.
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- If Nancy should become pregnant prior to that time, she will
have an abortion.
- This partnership may be dissolved by either party, at will,
upon six months notice to the other party.
- David agrees to pay Nancy the fixed sum of $50,000 if their
marriage terminates within 15 years, as liquidated damages for the
pain and suffering she will experience from the change in her expecta-
tions and life plans.
- If there are children, Nancy will have custody of the chil-
dren. David will have full responsibility for their support, as well as
the responsibility for compensating Nancy for her services in caring for
them (at the then current rate for private nurses). Suitable visiting
arrangements will be made.5 1
There are other provisions that have been omitted, but there is nothing in
them that in any way changes the character of the agreement from that indi-
cated by the quoted provisions. The couple has locked into a certain vision of
their future. It is sensible to have such visions and even to work them out in
some detail, but to attempt to turn them into legal rights and obligations will
probably be either simplistic or psychologically unrealistic.
Here we have an aspiring dancer-an additional fact is that she is good
enough to have won a two-year fellowship for a special training program in
Paris-who agrees to work as a secretary for the next four or five years.5 2 Now
it is psychologically plausible that both Nancy and David would believe in this
vision under the spell of romance, but that such a vision would persist during the
period Nancy works as a secretary is more doubtful. What happens if Nancy
wants to give up the sedentary secretarial life and return to the gambols of
dance? That would breach the agreement, would it not? But what can David do
about it? In fact, may Nancy not simply terminate the agreement at any time-
including the first year of marriage-and collect $50,000 for the one-year hiatus
in her dance career? It would seem that the prospective spouses were not con-
sidering this possiblity when they entered the agreement. They seem to have in
mind the problem of David jettisoning Nancy after he has begun, or is just about
to begin, his (presumably) lucrative career and effectively prevented her from
pursuing hers. But the terms of the agreement would equally apply if Nancy
tired of her doctor, divorced him, and married another dancer. She would still
be entitled to the $50,000, custody of the children, and, under a provision not
quoted above, "one-fourth of his net yearly income, to be paid quarterly, for as
long as he continues to practice medicine ... regardless of her earning capacity
or remarriage."5 3 Can David really be knowingly assuming this risk?
Picking apart this agreement-and I will pass over the church-and-country-
club-activities and no-abortion clauses- is not just a lawyer's exercise. My pur-
pose is to show the rigidity and one-sidedness in it because I think they are
51. L. WErrzMAN, supra note 10, at 297-99.
52. L. WErrzMAN, supra note 10, at 295.
53. L. WErrZMAN, supra note 10, at 299.
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endemic problems of writing such an agreement. If one were to attempt to cure
them with more specific and carefully considered provisions, the agreement
would quickly become psychologically unrealistic. What if Nancy becomes
pregnant while David is in medical school, the child is born, she stays home to
care for it, David works in the summer, and his parents help them out? Is
Nancy still entitled to the one-quarter interest in David's future earnings? Can
that not implausible set of contingencies be worked into the agreement? Would
it eliminate her interest in his earnings or reduce it to one-eighth or some other
fraction? Or would it permit David to rescind the agreement?
Antenuptial agreements, therefore, present a dilemma of sorts. If they are
kept very simple---"you keep what's yours and I'll keep what's mine"-they do
not address the situations in which there is significant specialization and reli-
ance, which may turn out to be detrimental, on the continuation of the marital
relationship. If an agreement does attempt to address the complexities of mari-
tal interaction, it may become so complex and confront the prospective spouses
with so many disagreeable possiblities that they will give up the project-the
agreement or the marriage, take your pick.
B. A Contract with Divorce Restrictions-Goals and Mechanisms
The Appendix to this Article contains an annotated antenuptial agreement
(hereinafter referred to as the Model Agreement) that attempts to diminish the
risks of divorce to the parties. The Model Agreement does not contain provi-
sions regarding the ongoing marital relationship, leaving the spouses to work out
nonbinding arrangements as they run the courses of their lives together. In-
stead, the agreement focuses on the key problem of investment in the marital
relationship. As noted above, because of the ease of terminating that relation-
ship, it is rational to hedge one's bets, to limit and to spread one's investment.54
But that very response makes the marital investment less attractive because it
increases the probability that the marriage will be terminated. The solution
worked out in the Model Agreement is to restrict divorce through two mecha-
nisms, which may be used in conjunction or in the alternative. The Model
Agreement bars divorce except in circumstances covered by the traditional fault
grounds of abandonment, adultery, or cruelty.55 It also burdens the divorce
decision by raising the costs of divorce to a spouse who obtains a unilateral no-
fault divorce.5 6 These increased costs include an unfavorable division of family
property;57 unfavorable division of family income, including postdivorce family
income;58 and the loss of child custody.59
As to the division of property under the Model Agreement, the divorced
spouse receives half of that portion of the net value of the divorcing spouse's
54. See supra text accompanying notes 24-42.
55. Model Agreement, para. 5.
56. Id. at para. 6.
57. Id. at para. 6(2).
58. Id. at para. 6(3).
59. Id. at para. 6(l).
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commercial or professional goodwill, licenses, or degrees developed or earned
during the marriage, but the divorcing spouse is not entitled to share in any
similar assets of the divorced spouse.6° The remainder of the family's prop-
erty-including the separate property of the divorcing spouse but not that of the
divorced spouse-is divided seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent in favor
of the divorced spouse, up to the point that the family property equals twice the
family's annual income.6 1 Thereafter, only marital property is divided, and on a
fifty-fifty basis. Future income is also unequally divided, with the divorced
spouse being entitled to sixty percent of the spouse's total income until the di-
vorced spouse remarries or enters into a marriage-like arrangement. 62 Finally,
child custody is awarded to the divorced spouse unless it can be shown clearly
and convincingly that such placement is seriously detrimental to the children.63
The imposition of these costs serves two purposes: first, to protect the
spouse who doesnot wish a divorce from the loss of property, income, and chil-
dren; and second, to deter the potential divorcing spouse from obtaining a di-
vorce by making the costs of divorce clear to the spouses from the outset. This
would provide an incentive to each spouse to continue to invest in the well-being
of her marital relationship. Indeed, the goal of both approaches- bar as well as
burden-is to provide the spouses with incentives to invest in the marital rela-
tionship, thereby preventing some divorces from occurring. The goal is not to
prevent all divorces. Neither approach prevents divorces to which the spouses
agree. They remain free to rescind the agreement and thus reinstate the back-
ground law of divorce.64 Nor does either approach prevent divorces when one
spouse is at fault.65 Only those divorces in which one spouse neither consents
nor is at fault are barred or deterred by this approach.
C. Application of the Model Approach to the Nancy and David Hypothetical
The Nancy and David hypothetical provides a useful test for the Model
Agreement. First, assume that David seeks a pure no-fault divorce from Nancy.
Under the agreement, such a divorce is barred. Nancy could offer to rescind the
contract on terms such as those set out in the antenuptial agreement above: a
payment of $50,000 and a one-quarter interest in David's earnings. Either
spouse might seek a financial package more favorable to him or her than this
one. If David breaks off negotiations and simply leaves, he is guilty of abandon-
ment, and Nancy is entitled to a fault divorce and to the financial provisions set
out in the Model Agreement.
Similarly, if David obtains a unilateral no-fault divorce because a court re-
fuses to enforce the provision barring such divorces, Nancy is entitled to the
greater share of the family's goods. First, she is entitled to fifty percent of the
60. Id. at para. 6(2)(a) & (b).
61. Id. at para. 6(2)(c).
62. Id. at para. 6(3).
63. Id. at para. 6(1).
64. Id. at para. 10.
65. Id. at paras. 7-8.
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value of David's professional goodwill, license, or degree. He, on the other
hand, as the divorcing spouse is not entitled to share in these intangibles if
Nancy has them. Thus, Nancy is entitled to a substantial amount regardless of
whether David divorces her immediately after graduating from medical school
or after establishing his practice. Second, she is entitled to seventy-five percent
of spousal property, which includes marital property and David's separate prop-
erty but not her own separate property, up to twice the family's annual income.
How she fares under this provision depends on when David seeks the divorce-
if during medical school or shortly thereafter, there will be little property and a
small income relative to the potential income from his expected medical prac-
tice. Third, she is entitled to support. This right differs from traditional alimony
in that it is not limited by the marital standard of living.
Now assume it is Nancy who seeks a pure no-fault divorce from David.
Once again, the divorce is barred under the Agreement, but David and Nancy
may agree to rescind the agreement on mutually acceptable terms. David is
protected from the possibility under the other agreement of losing his children,
$50,000, and one-quarter of his income when Nancy obtains a pure no-fault
divorce.
Should Nancy obtain the no-fault divorce, David would be entitled to sev-
enty-five percent of the marital property and Nancy's separate property up to
twice the couple's annual income. Further, he would be entitled to sixty percent
of their combined annual income. Assuming that David is the wealthier of the
two spouses, these provisions would probably not involve any transfers to him
from Nancy; however, he would not be required to make transfers to her when
she has obtained a unilateral no-fault divorce.
In comparing the two agreements, Nancy does not seem to fare worse
under our contract than under the apparently more tailored contract examined
above. 66 Under both she obtains compensation for being divorced. David, on
the other hand, fares better and is not exposed to the loss of wealth and children
when it is Nancy who obtains a unilateral no-fault divorce. Thus, the Model
Agreement is superior in that it treats the spouses equitably.
Another significant difference between the two agreements is that the
Model Agreement expressly restricts divorce, either by bar or burden, whereas
the other contract does not. Both spouses have given up the right to a pure
unilateral no-fault divorce although neither agreement locks the spouses into a
marriage they both would rather terminate as did the old fault divorce law.
David and Nancy may not want such an arrangement, but it must be recognized
that their existing agreement does burden David's decision to divorce Nancy.
Their existing agreement is to some extent a nonreciprocal version of the Model
Agreement. Further, they may modify the Model Agreement to make it more
like a reciprocal version of their existing agreement by eliminating the bar (Para-
graph 5).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Until twenty-five years ago, the United States Reports were virtually devoid
of marriage-and-divorce caselaw, apart from its jurisdiction-and-conflicts side-
show. 67 Since then, constitutionally guaranteed individual rights to marry 68 and
divorce69 have been recognized and now there is a constitutional aspect to every
governmental regulation of those two socio-legal rites of passage. Indeed, some
scholars have argued for a constitutional right to a unilateral no-fault divorce.70
Should such a right exist, contracts alienating it would be of doubtful validity.7 1
The argument for such a constitutional right is as follows: (1) There is a
fundamental right to marry under Zablocki v. Redhail;72 (2) the right to divorce
is as important as the right to marry under Boddie v. Connecticut ;73 (3) there-
fore, there is a fundamental right to divorce. Neither premise is justified by the
decided cases, however. As to the fundamental nature of marriage, it is a phrase
with more rhetorical sonority than operational significance. In other cases in-
volving fundamental rights, the laws or regulations restricting these rights have
been subjected to the withering gaze of strict scrutiny;74 but the -Court has ap-
plied the weaker, intermediate level of scrutiny to marriage restrictions even
when referring to it as a fundamental right.7 5 To be sure, marriage restrictions
do require a greater degree of justification than do restrictions on other interests,
but the Court has been careful not to commit itself to a position that would leave
67. Over the course of more than a century, the United States Supreme Court has decided
many cases arising under the due process and full faith and credit clauses. See, eg., Simons v.
Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
See, Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Prob-
lem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1967). Although many of these lawsuits
arose ultimately from forum shopping, the Court did not address the substantive law that motivated
the choice of forum.
I could not say entirely devoid because of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), in
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting polygamy as consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion.
68. Turner v. Salley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (marriage by prisoners); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage by persons with unpaid child support obligations); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (antimiscegenation laws).
69. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce by persons unable to pay court fees
and costs).
70. See Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce; A New Look at Some Unanswered Questions,
63 WASH. U.L.Q. 577 (1985); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
71. Because the Constitution restricts governmental rather than individual action, at issue is
whether contractual restrictions on divorce implicate governmental action sufficiently that the en-
forcement of these restrictions amounts to a constitutionally cognizable claim. The answer to this
vexed question substantially depends on the source of the right. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 18.6, at 1714-15 (2d ed. 1988). If the right to a unilateral no-fault divorce is not part
of the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process, then there is little likelihood that the
enforcement of the Model Agreement constitutes state action. But if the right to a unilateral no-fault
divorce is part of the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process, there is a greater
probability that enforcement of the Agreement constitutes state action. Id.
72. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
73. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
74. See L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 16-6 at 1451; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)
75. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386; see Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (1987) (striking down
statute on reasonable relationship test).
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the states with virtually no authority to restrict marriage. 76 Instead, the Court
has put marriage in a middle category. Marriage restrictions must be supported
by articulated, legitimate reasons.
Even assuming divorce has a constitutional stature equal to that of mar-
riage, the divorce restrictions of the Model Agreement can be supported by ar-
ticulated, legitimate reasons. In the first part of this Article I have shown that it
is rational for persons entering into marriage to limit termination of the relation-
ship in order both to encourage investment in the family and to protect those
investments once made.77 These goals have been approved under both state law
and federal constitutional law.78 Nor are these limitations imposed on unwilling
persons, as in the cases involving restrictions on interracial couples, 79 indi-
gents,80 and prisoners.8 1 The state is merely enforcing a marital regime that the
spouses have themselves specifically agreed to. Moreover, the spouses retain the
right to rescind the Agreement by mutual consent. In addition, divorce restric-
tions have been traditional in American and European culture,8 2 and the Court
has acknowledged its deference to traditional restrictions.8 3 Although no-fault
divorce now exists in all states, it is largely a phenomenon of the last quarter
century, which even by American standards cannot be fairly characterized as
traditional. Divorce restrictions can hardly be called "totally unprecedented,"
8 4
and are more likely to be viewed as exemplifying traditional family values. The
legal means to strengthen the marital tie are also narrowly tailored in that they
are focused on making the tie more difficult to sever without absolutely barring
divorce. Therefore, even if the second premise is granted, an inalienable right to
unilateral no-fault divorce cannot be derived from the cases characterizing mar-
riage as a fundamental right.
Moreover, the second premise need not be granted because the Supreme
Court's divorce cases do not support the claim that the right of divorce is equal
to the right of marriage. Although the Court's marriage cases have struck down
substantive restrictions on marriage, its divorce cases have not dealt with sub-
stantive restrictions, nor have they implied that substantive restrictions on di-
76. Justice Powell expressed the concern that the use of the strict scrutiny test would largely
deprive the states of their traditional-and in his view, proper-power to regulate marriage.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397-99 (Powell, J., concurring).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 25-42.
78. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting with approval Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211
(1888) (marriage is "the most important relation in life" and "the foundation of family and of soci-
ety, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress"); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106,
112-13 (W. Va. 1985) (upholding antenuptial agreement with divorce contingency on ground that
for some couples such agreements encourage marriage rather than unmarried cohabitation).
79. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
80. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374.
81. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
82. See generally M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW,(1972)
(history of divorce in United States).
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986); id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring);
see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion by Powell, J.).
84. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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vorce are open to attack. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 5 the case which purportedly
provides authority for the claim that the right to divorce has the same constitu-
tional stature as the right to marry, plaintiffs challenged various court costs in a
divorce action as violative of their due process rights. They claimed that because
of their indigency the imposition of such costs effectively barred them from ob-
taining divorces. The Court held this bar denied the plaintiffs due process
chiefly because divorce was thereby not equally available to rich and poor.86
Although acknowledging the fundamental importance of marriage and di-
vorce to individuals,87 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, emphasized al-
most exclusively the state's monopoly on divorce.8 8 Although the availability of
the courts may be of great significance to other legal relationships, the parties
typically have the authority to adjust their relationship by agreement. They may
settle a claim, adjust a debt, or rescind a contract. Not so with divorce; use of
the courts is a legal necessity.8 9 The Court did not suggest that the state must
provide a divorce to anyone who finds her marriage untenable. The Court held
only that the state may not "pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship
without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing
so." 9 Boddie did not question that basic preemption-that is, permitting disso-
lution only on grounds acceptable to the state.
In Sosna v. Iowa 91 the Court dealt with another procedural aspect of di-
vorce, a one-year residency requirement. The Court did not give divorce an
elevated constitutional status, but upheld the statute on the weak rational rela-
tion test, even though the case involved not only the interest in divorce but the
interest in interstate travel. The latter has been explicitly granted a privileged
constitutional status in other contexts, such as the interests of new residents in
voting, welfare, and medical care.92 Even the dissent did not raise doubts about
substantive restrictions on divorce. Justice Marshall admonished that "the
State's regulation [of divorce] be evenhanded," 93 and, in particular, that divorce
not be denied to new residents of a state when it is made available to those who
have resided there longer.94 Nothing in his opinion suggests that Justice Mar-
shall would find unconstitutional a provision that required persons to have been
separated for a year before they could file for divorce, or that limited divorce
grounds to mutual consent or fault.
Thus neither Boddie nor Sosna provides a basis for asserting that divorce
has a constitutional stature equal to marriage. Even if the state were not entitled
to restrict marriage, there is nothing in the Court's marriage and divorce cases to
85. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
86. Id. at 383.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 376.
89. Id. at 376-77.
90. Id. at 383.
91. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
92. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (medical care); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits).
93. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 423 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 423 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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undermine the state's ability to define marriage so as to exclude termination by
unilateral no-fault divorce. In sum, neither premise of the argument for a con-
stitutionally guaranteed inalienable right to unilateral no-fault divorce is sup-
ported by the cases. In addition, general concerns about nationalizing and,
indeed, constitutionalizing the law, 95 especially an area of law that has tradition-
ally been a matter of state regulation,96 militate against the creation of such a
right.
IV. CONTRACT LAW LIMITATIONS
The other general basis for attacking contractual restrictions on divorce is
that, as a matter of contract law, such restrictions are void as against public
policy. Although there is a dearth of cases directly on point, there is a substan-
tial body of case law involving antenuptial agreements, and there are cases on
other, analogous kinds of contracts that shed light on the problem.
A. The Covenant Not to Sue for Divorce
By the terms of the Model Agreement, if one of the spouses files for divorce,
the other is entitled to have the divorce action dismissed on the basis of the
covenant not to sue. There is only one appellate case nearly on point. In Towles
v. Towles 97 the spouses entered into a reconciliation agreement whereby the wife
promised that she would "'never again bring any suit at law or in equity'"
against the husband.98 She thereafter brought an action for support, and he
sought to have it dismissed on the basis of the reconciliation agreement. The
South Carolina Supreme Court held the agreement void as against public policy
insofar as it precluded her from enforcing a right granted her by the state.99
Accepting Towles as good law, it is distinguishable from cases arising under
the Model Agreement. First, the Model Agreement is not absolute: it does not,
as the Towles's agreement did, preclude a spouse from bringing any action
against the other. Indeed, it does not preclude her from bringing a divorce ac-
tion if she is able to show abandonment, adultery, or cruelty. Second, the Model
Agreement is not one-sided: it does not preclude just the wife, as the Towles's
agreement did, or just the husband from obtaining a pure unilateral no-fault
divorce; it precludes both.
The heart of the Towles opinion was that the parties could not contract out
95. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (lauding
federal system as permitting states to serve as laboratories "try[ing] novel social and economic exper-
iments without risk to the rest of the country"); see Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1210-11 (1977) (setting out various utilitarian and nonutilitarian values served by local rather
than central govermental control).
96. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of domestic
relations as 'an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.' Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).").
97. 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971).
98. Id. at 310, 182 S.E.2d at 54 (quoting from the spouses' agreement).
99. Id. at 311-12, 182 S.E.2d at 55.
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of their marital obligations, more particularly the husband's obligation to sup-
port his wife. But neither does the Model Agreement permit the parties to con-
tract out of their obligations. A refusal by a supporting spouse to support a
dependent spouse would amount to cruelty, and thus permit the dependent
spouse to obtain a divorce under the agreement. Thus, the one decided appellate
case does not imply that the covenant not to sue for divorce contained in the
Model Agreement is invalid.
1. Covenants Not to Sue in Tort
Although courts are, in general, chary of enforcing contractual provisions
calling for specific performance, 100 covenants not to sue are special because they
require the promisor to refrain from doing something. That something, more-
over, is pursuing a lawsuit. Not only are courts more willing to order someone
not to do something than the reverse,10 1 but it is fully within the power of the
court to effectuate its decision by dismissing the plaintiff's case.
Covenants not to sue are sometimes raised in tort cases, and courts gener-
ally give them effect short of cases of intentional wrongdoing.102 By analogy,
short of cases involving serious marital fault-abandonment, adultery, cruelty-
the spouses should be permitted to contract out of their right to use the courts to
remedy by divorce lesser, albeit real, grievances. Freedom to contract can, how-
ever, be overidden by the public interest.10 3 The state has traditionally asserted
a strong public interest in the alienability of marital rights and obligations, but
the liberalization of the divorce laws signals a fundamental change in this re-
gard. That strong public interest has atrophied, replaced by the view that mar-
riage is primarily the spouses' affair, a "bilateral loyalty."'04 The liberalization
of divorce laws represents the state's withdrawal from its traditional role as the
third (and dominant) party to the marriage contract. It does not represent the
state's insistence, as the third party, that the marriage be terminated when one of
the spouses unilaterally decides that it should be. Although the state no longer
prohibits divorce when both spouses or even only one wants a divorce, it does
not follow that the state should interfere when the spouses have made another,
more restrictive arrangement. Hence, the covenant not to sue for divorce should
be given effect.
There is, however, a notable difference between a covenant not to sue for
negligence and a covenant not to sue for divorce. The usual result of the former
is that the parties go their separate ways with no further involvement between
them, whereas the result of the latter is that the parties remain locked in a rela-
100. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 4.95, 520-23 (1962).
101. 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1137, at 102 & n.16 (1964).
102. Jefferson County Bank v. Armored Motor Serv., 148 Colo. 343, 366 P.2d 134 (1961); Cash
v. Street & Trail, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 462, 221 S.E.2d 640 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 195 (1) comment a (1979) ("[A] party to a contract can ordinarily exempt himself
from liability for harm caused by his failure to observe the standard of reasonable care imposed by
the law of negligence.").
103. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (2)(b) illustration 1 (1979).
104. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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tionship that one of them wants to end. For guidance on that aspect of the
problem, it is helpful to consider negative covenants and partnerships for a term.
These situations resemble contractual restrictions on divorce because the parties
have agreed that their relationship will have especially strong legal bonds.
2. Personal Service Contracts with Negative Covenants
and Partnerships for a Term
There have long been attempts to impose contractual restrictions on the
terminability of personal relationships other than the marital relationship, such
as those governed by personal service and partnership contracts. Personal ser-
vice contracts sometimes contain a negative covenant whereby the promisor
agrees not to perform for another during the term of the contract. 105 Contrac-
tual bars to divorce are analogous in that the spouse raising the contract is seek-
ing to hold the other spouse to her promise not to do something-not to seek a
divorce-rather than to compel her to interact affectionately with her spouse.
As to the partnership analogy, absent an agreement to the contrary, each
member of a business partnership has the right to dissolve the partnership at
will.10 6 Thus, a business partnership is analogous to modern marriage in which
each spouse has the right to dissolve at will. Partnership agreements may, how-
ever, include a provision establishing a specific duration for the partnership-a
term of years, the completion of a project, or, like traditional marriage, the joint
lifetime of the partners-which thereby extinguishes the right to dissolve the
relationship at will.
Inevitably, cases arise in which the promisor desires to perform for another
while the negative covenant is in effect or the business partner desires to dissolve
the partnership before the expiration of the term. The courts have accorded
great weight to personal freedom in these cases. They have refused to enforce
personal service contracts by specific performance10 7 and have been reluctant,
but not entirely unwilling, to check the exercise of personal freedom with an
injunction.108 However, in the leading case, Lumley v. Wagner,10 9 the Lord
Chancellor did enforce a negative covenant by enjoining the defendant from per-
forming a contract that she had entered into in violation of the negative cove-
nant in her contract with the plaintiff. At the heart of the Lord Chancellor's
opinion was his belief that the willingness of the English courts to use the injunc-
tive remedy "had a wholesome tendency towards the maintenance of that good
faith [in contractual relations] which exists in this country to a much greater
105. Eg., Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Lumley v.
Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
106. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31(l)(b), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1914); PARTNERSHIP ACT OF 1890
(U.K.) § 32(c).
107. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852); 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 101, § 1204, at
398.
108. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Lumley v. Wagner,
42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852); 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 101, §§ 1204-09.
109. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
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degree perhaps than in any other." 110 Although the Lord Chancellor stated that
he was not effectively ordering the defendant to perform her contract with the
plaintiff, he was not overly concerned about restricting her personal freedom nor
about the possibility that she might choose to sing for Lumley after all. 1 1
Courts and commentators more solicitous of the personal freedom of con-
tractors have taken a restrictive view of Lumley v. Wagner. Generally it has
been confined to situations in which the breaching party would perform for a
competitor of the promisee.
This line of cases raises serious doubts about the efficacy of contractual bars
to divorce. Although Lumley establishes the viability of the specific perform-
ance remedy for a negative covenant, our context does not present the salient
features of that rather closely confined category. Unless the party asserting the
divorce restriction could show that the other spouse was seeking the divorce in
order to marry a particular person, the requirement of competition would not be
met. Even if such a rival existed, the abolition in most jurisdictions of the alien-
ation of affections action suggests that the presence of such competition would
be given no weight in deciding whether to enforce the contractual restriction on
divorce. Further, the marital relationship is a fiduciary one. A court would be
reluctant to bar a party from severing a fiduciary relation once the necessary
trust and confidence were gone. 112
Partnership law points to a similar conclusion. Under the Uniform Part-
nership Act, even when the partners have agreed to continue the partnership for
a specific duration, each partner retains the power to dissolve the partnership at
will. 113 Such an action is not without adverse legal consequences to the breach-
ing partner, 114 but his power to dissolve is inalienable. 115 In addition, a business
partner may petition a court to dissolve a partnership prior to the expiration of
its term for various reasons, including "no fault" reasons.1 16
The dissolution of the marital relationship always requires a judicial act,
whereas the dissolution of a business partnership may always be effected by the
unilateral act of a member. The question for the court in our situation would be
110. Id. at 693.
ll. The Lord Chancellor stated that Ms. Wagner "has no cause of complaint fI compel her to
abstain from the commission of an act which she has bound herself not to do, and thus possibly
cause her to fulfil her engagement." Id.
112. Page One Records, Ltd. v. Britton, 3 All E.R. 822 (1967).
113. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1914).
114. He may be liable to the remaining partners for damages caused by his breach. Id.
§ 38(2)(a)II, 6 U.L.A. at 456. The remaining partners may continue the business without liquida-
tion, id. § 38(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 456, and if they continue the business, the withdrawing partner's
proportionate share of the business does not include goodwill. Id. § 38(2)(c)II, 6 U.L.A. at 456-57;
see Hiliman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the
Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1982).
115. Under the English Partnership Act of 1890, however, an agreement that the partnership is
to be terminated "by mutual agreement only" will be enforced and will prevent termination at the
will of a single partner. See Moss v. Elphick, 1 K.B. 846 (1910). See generally A. UNDERHILL,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 30 (10th ed. 1975) (treatise on English partnership law).
116. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 32(1)(e), (f), 6 U.L.A. 394 (1914). These "no fault" reasons
are: "the business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss," and "other circumstances
render a dissolution equitable." Id.
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whether it should aid a party seeking to breach an agreement by granting a
divorce. Courts have asserted that they will not dissolve a business partnership
at the request of a partner seeking dissolution in contravention of the agree-
ment.117 Such cases are distinguishable because the business partner does not
need the court in order to terminate the relationship; she has the power of uni-
lateral termination. Thus, there is no need for the court to act. Further, in
negative covenant cases, the court actually aids the breaching party in denying
the injunction. The difference between the "affirmative" act of granting an in-
junction and the "negative" act of estopping a party from seeking a divorce is
merely a formal one. In both cases a court is acting in favor of one party against
another.
American partnership law and the negative covenant cases indicate a strong
preference for the freedom to terminate legal relationships involving significant
personal commitment. These areas of the law suggest a court would invalidate
the covenant not to sue for divorce. Although the court is placed in the position
of aiding a party to breach her agreement, a role rejected by the courts in part-
nership cases, this rather formalistic point should not be sufficient to persuade
courts to sustain the covenant not to sue for divorce. The case law suggests,
then, that the contractual bar to divorce is unenforceable, not because the state
insists on the inalienability of the right to divorce in particular, but because it
has insisted more generally on the inalienability of the power to terminate per-
sonal relationships, including personal service and partnership relationships.
3. Other Perspectives on Specific Enforcement of the Covenant
not to Sue for Divorce
Putting analogous cases to one side, one may ask anew whether specific
performance of the agreement is necessary because the damages remedy is inade-
quate. The losses, or potential losses, that a person experiences at divorce are
several: (1) the loss of accumulated wealth; (2) the loss of income; (3) the loss of
spousal companionship; (4) the loss of the legal status of a married person;
(5) the loss of the social status of a married person; and (6) the loss of children.
The first two losses are financial and are amenable, albeit not fully amenable, to
redress through an order to pay money or transfer property. 18 As to the third
loss, if it is amenable to judicial redress of any sort, it is damages rather than
specific enforcement, since a court cannot effectively order a person to be a
spousal companion. The fourth loss can be prevented by an order barring di-
vorce. To the extent that the fifth loss is derived from one's legal marital status
(married or divorced) rather than one's social marital status (couple living to-
gether more or less harmoniously), it too can be affected by such an order. It is,
however, increasingly doubtful that anyone's social status is significantly based
117. Yoder v. Hooper, 695 P.2d 1182, 1187-88 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd en banc, 737 P.2d
852 (Colo. 1987); Collins v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258, 261 (rex. Civ. App. 1955).
118. One may assume that no court will order an adult to cohabit with another, even if that
other is her spouse, for the sake of complementarity or economies of scale.
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on her legal marital status independent of her social marital status.1 19 Finally,
the sixth loss is amenable to an order of specific enforcement, but that order is a
custody order and not an order barring divorce.' 20
Therefore, our focus is on the preservation of the legal status of married
persons by specific performance. We will assume the loss of this status cannot
be adequately compensated by an award of damages. What nonmonetary inter-
ests does such specific enforcement protect? Vindictiveness, of course, is an un-
acceptable foundation, but a substantial reason for making marriage difficult to
dissolve is to provide an incentive to investment in marriage at a time when the
spouses are psychologically open to such investment. In order to give that in-
vestment legal efficacy the court must specifically enforce the agreement at a
time when one of the spouses is not psychologically open to investment. This
analysis views marriage as deteriorating in substantial part because of under-
investment and maintains that investment in marriage can be increased by re-
ducing alternative investments.121
Moreover, as a matter of legal and cultural history, there has been a differ-
ence between marriage and the personal relationships treated above. Even when
the power to dissolve other contractual relationships was treated as inalienable,
the dissolution of marriage was highly restricted. The marriage regime has
moved closer to these other situations, but the difference between them may be
recognized by permitting spouses to contract into a more restrictive regime,
while prohibiting such contractual restrictions in other situations. In marriage,
the unit, or family, is of much greater importance than in the business partner-
ship or the producer-performer relationship, which does not even suggest the
formation of a unit. Thus, self-imposed restrictions on the dissolution of the
family unit are more justifiable.
A liberal, pluralistic legal culture does not require that every member her-
self be liberal; it should protect persons with traditional and restrictive views and
projects. Agreements to give a religious divorce have been enforced,122 sug-
gesting a willingness to make the legal system available for the enforcement of
promises that have only a cultural significance.123 Moreover, as stated above, it
is rational to establish a restrictive rule with respect to divorce in order to en-
courage investment and simultaneously diminish opportunity costs.1 24
By enforcing contractual bars to purely unilateral no-fault divorce, the state
would permit the parties a range of marital or quasi-marital regimes. Toward
one end of the spectrum would be unmarried cohabitation contracts; at the
119. See generally Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Separation and Divorce: Causes and
Consequences, 90 AM. J. Soc. 856 (1985) (examining broadening approval of marital dissolution and
major determinants of personal attitudes about divorce).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 175-214.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 21-42.
122. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 114-15, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574-75, 446 N.E.2d 136,
138-39, cerL denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
123. Nothing more than a legal divorce was necessary for Mrs. Avitzur to remarry under the
civil law. Moreover, ordering Mr. Avitzur to appear before the Beth Din was essentially the same as
ordering Wagner to sing in Lumley's theater.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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center would be statutory marriage, with its financial incidents largely modifia-
ble by spousal agreement; and toward the other end of the spectrum would be
the regime governed by the Model Agreement, with limited revival of the tradi-
tional marital regime but acceptance, in addition to traditional fault divorce, of
no-fault divorce to which the spouses mutually agree. Given the modern legal
recognition that marriage is first and foremost a private matter, albeit with sig-
nificant public consequences, and that deference to the spouses' judgment is the
proper attitude of the state, it is reasonable for the state to accept their mutual
determination at the outset of-or, for that matter, during-their marriage that
there are some real risks that will not justify dissolving the marriage.
In conclusion, although the personal service contract cases and American
partnership law suggest the right to divorce should be inalienable, that law is not
unassailable in principle, and indeed English partnership law runs counter to
American law on the matter of the power of dissolving partnerships for a
term.125 Moreover, the traditional recognition of the family as a strongly bound
unit, together with the availability of other marital and quasi-marital regimes,
suggests that covenants not to sue for divorce-so long as they are not abso-
lute-should be enforced.
B. Contractual Burdens on Divorce
1. Traditional Law of Divorce Contingencies in Antenuptial Agreements
Even assuming divorce cannot be contractually barred, it remains to be
considered whether the right to divorce can be constrained indirectly by means
of burdens. This is the issue raised by Sanders v. Sanders,126 referred to at the
beginning of this Article. The Sanders' antenuptial agreement provided for the
pooling of their resources and the forfeiture of any rights to those assets by the
spouse who sought a divorce. 127 Thus the disincentive fell on the party seeking
divorce, regardless of whether that person was the husband or wife or the
wealthier or poorer spouse.
When Sanders was decided in 1955, the law regarding financial provisions
in antenuptial agreements was well settled throughout the United States. If such
provisions were contingent upon death, they were valid; if contingent upon di-
vorce, they were invalid, either presumptively or conclusively. 128 The reason for
invalidating divorce contingencies was that they provided an incentive to di-
vorce. 129 Although the antenuptial agreement in Sanders could have been justi-
fied as attempting to provide each spouse with financial incentives to remain
married, the agreement did attempt to displace the divorce court in allocating
125. See supra note 115.
126. 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1955).
127. Id. at 23-24, 288 S.W.2d at 474-75.
128. Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 112 (W.
Va. 1985) (stating traditional law); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRcraS § 584(1) (1932); Annotation,
Validity ofAntenuptialAgreement, or "Companionate Marriage" Contract, Which Facilitates or Con-
templates Divorce or Separation," 70 A.L.R. 826, 827 (1931).
129. Fincham v. Finchan, 160 Kan. 683, 688-89, 165 P.2d 209, 212-13, modified to permit divi-
sion of property, 161 Kan. 753, 173 P.2d 244 (1946); Annotation, supra note 128, at 826-28.
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wealth at the time of divorce. There was no precedent for upholding such an
agreement, and a great deal of precedent for invalidating it. 130 It is not surpris-
ing that the trial court held the Sanders' agreement contravened public policy.
Interestingly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the lower court,
though it did not entirely disagree with it. The court declared the forfeiture
provision to be reasonable given the marital history of this couple; however, the
court limited the application of the provision to a divorce suit not prosecuted in
good faith and upon reasonable grounds. The opinion suggests that if the di-
vorce petitioner was successful, he or she would thereby satisfy the good faith
and reasonableness requirement.13 1 Consequently, under the court's interpreta-
tion of the agreement, the forfeiture provision is really based on wrongful civil
proceedings rather than on simply filing for divorce.1 32 By so interpreting the
contract, the court avoided the issue relied upon by the trial court, namely, that
agreeing to limit one's right to obtain a divorce is violative of public policy and
unenforceable.
That issue, however, is the theoretically interesting question raised by Sand-
ers and the one with which this Article is concerned. That general question has
three aspects. First and fundamentally, do all divorce contingencies in antenup-
tial agreements that seek to displace, or substantially limit, the divorce court
violate public policy?13 3 Second, if such contractual burdens are not invalid per
se, then is the particular distribution of wealth a violation of public policy?134
Third, again if such contractual burdens are not invalid per se, is awarding cus-
tody of the children to the divorced spouse or the divorcing spouse who can
show fault a violation of public policy? 135 This Article will discuss these ques-
tions in turn.
2. The Rejection of the Categorical Rejection of Divorce Contingencies
Since the landmark case of Posner v. Posner,136 which rejected the tradi-
tional nonenforcement of divorce contingencies, the traditional rule has crum-
bled, if not disappeared. 1 37 Four justifications are given for upholding divorce
contingencies. The first is logical. In Posner, the court pointed out that the
traditional critique could be applied with equal force to death contingencies as
130. See Annotation, supra note 128.
131. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. at 35, 288 S.W.2d at 479.
132. Regarding wrongful civil proceedings, see W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (5th ed. 1984).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 136-62.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 163-74.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 175-214.
136. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
137. Annotation, Modem Status of Views as to Validity of Premarital Agreements Contemplating
Divorce or Separation, 53 A.L.R.4TH 22, 29 (1987). For a rare and recent reaffirmation of the tradi-
tional rule, see Sousley v. Sousley, 614 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Ky. 1981) (refusing to overrule the "long
standing precedent" of Stratton v. Stratton, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916), and thus invalidating
antenuptial agreement contemplating divorce). Courts are more likely to invalidate maintenance
provisions in the antenuptial agreement than property provisions. See In re Marriage of Winegard,
278 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Iowa), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913,
915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
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well as divorce contingencies. To use the court's example: A wife who did not
like her prospects under the antenuptial agreement if her husband predeceased
her would have an incentive to divorce in the hope that she would fare better in
divorce court than under the agreement.' 38 The Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded that the critique itself was bad as applied to either contingency.1 39
A second, more important justification for upholding divorce contingencies
is the altered social and legal status of divorce. Not only has the incidence of
divorce increased in American society, but divorce is also more readily available
because it does not require proof of marital guilt or fault.14 The Posner court
pointed to the then-new no-fault law in California. 14 1 Today, of course, it could
point to the existence of no-fault divorce provisions in every state.142 In some
states, it is virtually the only basis for divorce.' 4 3
The Posner court drew two conclusions from these social changes. First, it
was rational for persons to plan for divorce even when they intended that their
marriage last a lifetime. 44 Second, the public policy objection to divorce was
clearly much weaker.' 45 If the state readily permitted persons to dissolve their
marriages, it would be disingenuous for courts to assert an apparently anti-
quated public policy to countermand the rational divorce plans of the spouses.
The court decided it would not invalidate divorce contingencies on a wholesale
basis, but would operate at a retail level, invalidating only those provisions ex-
cessively inducing divorce.146 This approach has been adopted by courts in a
number of other jurisidictions.147
A third justification for upholding divorce contingencies is that they do not
really provide an incentive to divorce in most cases. 148 A fourth justification is a
curious transformation of the traditional policy favoring marriage. Because
there are now fewer disincentives to cohabitation without marriage, many per-
138. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 383.
139. Id. at 383-84.
140. Id. at 384.
141. Id.
142. In 1985 South Dakota became the last state to enact a no-fault divorce statute. I 1 Fano. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1274 (Apr. 9, 1985).
143. See, eg., Act of June 24, 1983, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 548, ch. 613, § I (repealing fault
grounds for absolute divorce).
144. Posner, 233 So..2d at 384; see Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 115 (W. Va. 1985).
145. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 384; Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731-32 (Colo. 1982) (en
banc).
146. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 385. In re Marriage of Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 215 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1985), is an example of a court's invalidating an antenuptial agreement at the retail level. In
that case the spouses' antenuptial agreement provided that "in the event of a divorce" the husband
would settle on the wife "the house... and $500,000.00 or one-half of my assets, whichever is
greater . I. " d. at 329, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 155. After seven months of marriage, the wife obtained a
divorce. The trial court upheld the agreement, but the court of appeal reversed, not because divorce
contingencies were invalid per se, but because this agreement encouraged the wife "to seek a dissolu-
tion, and with all deliberate speed, lest the husband suffer an untimely demise, nullifying the con-
tract, and the wife's right to the money and property." Id. at 331, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 156. The court
added, 'The prospect of receiving a house and a minimum of $500,000 by obtaining the no-fault
divorce available in California would menace the marriage of the best intentioned spouse." Id. at
331, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
147. See Annotation, supra note 137.
148. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (Colo. 1982).
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sons will choose this form of intimate association unless they can order their
financial affairs by antenuptial agreements in a way that does not put their assets
at the statistically substantial risk of divorce. Because there is a societal prefer-
ence for marriage, divorce contingencies should be upheld so that people can
marry, confident that their wealth is not in jeopardy. 149
Judicial rejection of the traditional rule has been seconded by legislative
developments. Equitable distribution statutes permit spouses to contract out of
the statutory regime and determine their property rights upon divorce by ante-
nuptial or separation agreements.1 50 In addition, a Uniform Premarital Agree-
ments Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 19831-" and by the end of 1987 had been adopted by
eleven states. 152 The Act provides that the parties to a premarital agreement
may contract with respect to, inter alia, the disposition of property upon separa-
tion or marital dissolution15 3 and the modification or elimination of spousal
support.15
4
3. Application to the Model Agreement
These judicial and legislative changes, and the justifications on which they
rest, provide substantial support for upholding the divorce contingencies of the
Model Agreement as well. The Model Agreement makes marriage more attrac-
tive to persons concerned with protecting their investments in marriage to an
extent that modern divorce law does not, and thus provides them with an incen-
tive to make those investments which they otherwise would not make. There are
two substantial differences between the Model Agreement and the classic ante-
nuptial agreement that may raise doubts about the former's validity even under
a regime that generally accepts divorce contingencies. First, the Model Agree-
ment may involve a substantial transfer of assets to the divorced spouse. Under
the classic agreement, there is either no transfer or the transferor is probably
better off with the agreement than she would be without it. Second, the Model
Agreement is not simply divorce-conscious, but expressly burdens the decision
to divorce. The classic antenuptial agreement only incidentally provides divorce
incentives or disincentives. To the extent such incentives or disincentives exist,
they are a function of the individual's wealth. A spouse without an independent
source of income will be less likely to seek a divorce than a spouse with one, but
the classic agreement does not allocate wealth on the basis of which spouse ob-
tains the divorce. This Article will address these concerns in turn.
Although the courts are rightly concerned about an agreement that permits
a spouse to gain substantially upon divorce, the chief concern is that a spouse
149. Id. at 731; Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 112-13 (W. Va. 1985).
150. See, ag., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(d) (1987).
151. 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
152. Id. at 6 (1988 Supp.) (Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Maine, Montana North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia).
153. UNIF. PREmARrrAL AGREEMENT AcT § 3(a)(3), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
154. Id. § 3(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. at 373.
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can gain by exercising her right to divorce. In In re Noghrey, for example, had
the couple's antenuptial agreement been upheld, the wife would have gained a
house and at least half-a-million dollars upon divorcing her husband of seven
months. 155 But this situation could not arise under the Model Agreement be-
cause a spouse is not benefited by obtaining a divorce; quite the opposite. The
possibility remains, however, that one spouse may attempt to goad the other into
obtaining a divorce in order for the goader to obtain the preferred distribution of
family wealth upon divorce.15 6 The Agreement provides some check on goading
in that it permits a spouse who can show cruelty on the part of the other spouse
not only to divorce but to obtain the preferred distribution of family wealth.
Thus the Agreement deters goading that amounts to cruelty. Cruelty as defined
by the agreement is "cruel and wanton conduct calculated to inflict suffering on
the other spouse." 157 It is not required that the other spouse suffer physical
injury or be subjected to a threat to her health. A key point is the intention of
the spouse allegedly inflicting the cruelty. If the conduct is "calculated to inflict
suffering," it may amount to cruelty if it is also cruel and wanton. If it can be
shown that a spouse has been goading her spouse to drive him to seek a divorce,
that behavior clearly meets the requirement of "calculated to inflict suffering."
Hence, the Agreement does not provide an incentive for a spouse to seek a di-
vorce, either by obtaining one directly or by goading the other to seek one.
The other general objection is that the right to divorce should not be bur-
dened by disincentives to the divorcing spouse. The cases on negative covenants
and partnerships for a term examined earlier 158 clearly support the proposition
that the decision to terminate a relationship in breach of contract subjects the
breaching party to damages. 159 The interest in personal autonomy does not ex-
tend so far as to insulate a person from any disincentive. In addition, the Posner
line of cases also accepts that at least one spouse will have a financial disincen-
tive toward divorce-the spouse who would in the absence of an agreement
share in a greater portion of the family wealth. 160 The Model Agreement simply
puts both spouses under the same disincentive.
Moreover, as stated earlier, 161 the state's adoption of no-fault divorce
should not be interpreted as furthering a policy of government insistence on a
155. In re Marriage of Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 331, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (1985); see
supra note 146.
156. See, eg., Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 688, 165 P.2d 209, 213 (1946) (husband
might become "grossly abusive, completely intolerable and deliberately bring about separation");
Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 499-500, 167 P.2d 848, 854 (1946) (husband might have
"'everything to gain and nothing to lose' by bringing about such a condition of the marital relation-
ship as would render divorce or separation proceedings by the wife imperative").
157. Model Agreement, para. 11(3).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 105-17.
159. In Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852), Ms. Wagner's counsel, in opposing the
issuance of an injunction, "contend[ed] that the agreement is a purely personal contract, for the
infraction of which damages are a complete and ample remedy ...." Id. at 689. Regarding partner-
ships, see supra note 114.
160. See, eg., Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981) (husband stands to
gain by not divorcing); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985) (wife stands to gain by not
divorcing).
161. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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divorce even if only one spouse wants it, but rather as a withdrawal by the state
from its traditional paternalistic posture toward married couples. In its new
posture, the state permits married couples to subject themselves to their own
rules, much as it does in other areas, such as the transfer of property upon the
owner's death. The rules of inheritance do not prohibit disinheritance, and to
the extent that they prohibit the complete disinheritance of a spouse,162 the
Model Agreement is in accord in that it prohibits the complete denial (directly
or indirectly) of divorce by allowing for divorce if there is a showing of abandon-
ment, adultery, or cruelty. Even more on the point, the states' recognition of
quasi-marital obligations arising from quasi-marital relations indicate their will-
ingness to allow the persons involved to set the terms of their intimate
relationships. 163
C. Distributions Contingent on Divorce: Liquidated Damages or Penalties?
Assuming that financial burdens intentionally placed on the exercise of the
right of unilateral no-fault divorce are not invalid per se, it remains to be deter-
mined whether there are limits to those burdens. Surely, the Sanders' winner-
take-all distribution scheme is suspect, and in Noghrey, the court was disturbed
by the sheer size of the stakes-a house and half-a-million dollars. 64 Con-
versely, one justification for upholding divorce contingencies is that they have a
negligible effect on the divorce decision. 165 It is assumed, however, that the
terms of the Model Agreement are substantial burdens on the divorce decision.
The question addressed in this section is whether the burden is excessive and
thus unjustifiable.
Consider contracts other than the Model Agreement that provide for spe-
cific payments should a breach occur. With respect to such payments, contract
law distinguishes between penalties," which are not permissible, and liquidated
damages, which are-as long as the amount is reasonable.' 6 6 Liquidated dam-
ages are essentially based on need-the need arising from the loss occasioned by
the promisor's failure to perform-whereas penalties are not. To be sure, the
purpose of a penalty is to deter the need's arising in the first place, but the size of
the payment more than compensates the need.
Marriage and divorce-related contracts also call for payments either to stop
or start upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, in particular marriage and
remarriage.1 67 When the contingency occurs, payment or forfeiture of payment
has been challenged as against public policy because it tends to inhibit the exer-
162. See P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 134-43 (1987).
163. See, eg., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (even a
tacit understanding may be enforceable); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987)
(claim stated for breach of express or impled contract).
164. See supra note 146.
165. See supra text accompanying note 148.
166. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 101, §§ 1057 & 1059.
167. See, eg., In re Dodge, 150 Ill. App. 3d 486, 501 N.E.2d 1354 (1986) (forfeitures upon
remarriage valid generally); Cowan v. Cowan, 247 Iowa 729, 75 N.W.2d 920 (1956) (some forfeit-
ures restraining second marriage are void).
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cise of the right to marry. 168 Some of these provisions are based on expected
need or loss and are thus analagous to liquidated damages; others are not and
are more like penalties. By applying general contract law, the need-based provi-
sions should be upheld, but the provisions not based on need should be
invalidated. 169
A recent example of a need-related restraint is In re Dodge,170 in which the
Illinois Appellate Court upheld a separation agreement providing that a former
husband would be released from paying taxes on the family home if his former
wife remarried. It is a basic tenet of divorce law that alimony is based on need
and terminates upon the payee's remarriage because of the conclusively pre-
sumed reduction of need.' 71 The tax payment in Dodge closely resembled ali-
mony payments, and its termination can be justified on reduced need. 172
Losses similar to those arising upon divorce are commonly calculated in
wrongful death cases and consist of loss of consortium, loss of income, and loss
of services. 173 The lost consortium component should be excluded from the di-
vorce context. Where damages are awarded, the consortium is lost through in-
vasion of a third party. Outside invasions are not at issue in our context,
however, and the law should not be used to sanction a person for not being
companionable. Loss of income, however, and loss of services provided to the
family by the former spouse are more readily transferable from the wrongful
death context to the divorce context. These losses are not so intimately tied to
the quality of the interpersonal relationship as is loss of consortium. Although it
is socially unacceptable to hire someone for sexual services or companionship, it
is perfectly permissible to hire babysitters, tutors, cooks, housecleaners, launder-
ers, painters, mechanics, plumbers, gardeners, etc. To the extent that the di-
vorcing spouse provided any of these or other similar services, the divorced
spouse is deprived of them. Of course, the divorced spouse may, after divorce,
perform them herself, but such performance costs time she would have spent
either earning income, performing other household services, resting, or engaging
in activities for personal pleasure.
Another major loss is loss of the divorcing spouse's income, whether earned
or unearned, including loss of future increases in income. Still other losses arise
168. See supra note 166.
169. Although the courts appear to be more chary of penalty provisions, cases can be found
upholding both sorts of payments. In Cowan v. Cowan, 247 Iowa 729, 75 N.W.2d 920 (1956), for
example, the parties entered into a "collateral agreement" just prior to divorce that provided that if
either party should remarry before their youngest child reached the age of majority, he or she would
pay $10,000 to the other. When the former husband remarried within the proscribed period, the
former wife sued on the contract and won. The court justified its decision on the grounds that the
restraint was not general and that it was reasonable. It was not general because the restraint was
limited to the period prior to the youngest son's reaching the age of majority-seven or eight years.
Id. at 735, 75 N.W.2d at 923-24. It was reasonable, in the court's view, because the apparent pur-
pose of the agreement was to prevent the marriage of the father and the woman with whom he had
committed adultery as long as the sons were minors and living at home with the father. The court
declared this purpose to be "laudable." Id. at 735, 75 N.W.2d at 924.
170. 150 Ill. App. 3d 486, 501 N.E.2d 1354 (1986).
171. H. CLARK, supra note 6, § 14.9, at 457.
172. In re Dodge, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 494, 501 N.E.2d at 1358-59.
173. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.4 (1973).
[Vol. 66
CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS ON DIVORCE
from lost complementarity and lost economies of scale. The spouses may have
had children and a high standard of living because one of the spouses specialized
in income producing labor and the other in unpaid domestic labor. Upon di-
vorce, this complementarity or synergy is lost. As to lost economies of scale,
painting and heating costs, for example, are the same whether one or both
spouses live in the house. House payments or rent remain the same for the
particular dwelling, and because spouses share virtually every room in their
dwelling, no savings are obtained by a person when his spouse leaves. The re-
maining person still needs all these rooms or areas and they must be of virtually
the same size.
The result is familiar enough: the divorced spouse has substantial losses of
money and time imposed on him. The financial provisions of the Model Agree-
ment are intended to liquidate those losses, which are prospective at the time the
Agreement is entered into and virtually impossible to fix precisely. It is espe-
cially difficult to liquidate the losses in dollars, because the Agreement may
come into effect many years later when the value of the dollar as well as the
financial condition of the couple may substantially differ from their status at the
time of the execution of the Agreement.
Because the provisions of the Agreement are aimed at compensating the
divorced spouse for the losses described above, rather than penalizing the di-
vorcing spouse, the Model Agreement does not employ the winner-takes-all
form of the Sanders' antenuptial agreement. The unequal division of the prop-
erty and future income compensate for lost complementarity and lost economies
of scale. The divorced spouse's continued sharing in the divorcing spouse's in-
creases of income compensates for reasonable expectation at the time of mar-
riage that each will share in the other spouse's fortune, good or bad. These
latter provisions are contrary to the policy favoring a clean break at the time of
divorce, but the spouses have clearly chosen to subject themselves to a different
regime. There is nothing so plainly harmful in that regime to justify a paternal-
istic imposition of the state's regime in preference to the one the spouses have
chosen for themselves.
Where the income and wealth of the spouses are roughly equal or where the
divorced spouse has less income and wealth, the unequal distribution of wealth
and income provided for in the Model Agreement can be fairly characterized as
liquidated damages. The case in which the divorcing spouse has substantially
less wealth and income than the divorced spouse is more problematic. Of
course, in this situation the income provision will be of no consequence since the
divorced spouse will by hypothesis make at least sixty percent of the couple's
combined post-divorce income by herself; therefore, the divorcing spouse will
not be obligated to transfer any portion of his significantly smaller income. But
the spousal property will be divided in favor of the divorced spouse and the
divorced spouse will be entitled to fifty percent of the value of the human capital
built up by the divorcing spouse during the marriage.
It is commonplace under the classic, preservation-of-separate-property an-
tenuptial agreement for one spouse to receive by far the greater portion of the
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couple's net assets upon divorce, and these agreements are enforced. 174 Thus the
disparity is not in itself enough to invalidate this agreement. Even when the
divorced spouse is considerably wealthier than the divorcing spouse, the latter
may impose a loss on the former in the form of either loss of income or loss of
services (apart from loss of consortium). If the divorcing spouse is one who
stays at home and cares for the house and the children, the loss of her services
imposes a considerable loss on the other spouse.1 75 The seventy-five percent to
twenty-five percent division of this property is a fair premarital estimate of the
extent of the loss occasioned by the divorcing spouse's withdrawal of services,
and therefore should be enforced as liquidated damages.
D. Antenuptial Agreements Regarding Child Custody upon Divorce
One of the substantial costs of divorce is the mutual separation of the chil-
dren and the noncustodial spouse. 176 This basic cost of separation can be in-
creased by the remarriage of the custodial parent 177 or by a substantial
geographical move that makes een bi-weekly visits practically impossible.17 8
The trend toward joint custody does not in many instances alleviate these
costs.1 79 In some instances, joint custody means merely joint legal custody; the
residential arrangement is the same as under the typical sole custody arrange-
ment--every other weekend with the parent with whom the children do not
reside.1 80 Even in cases of joint physical custody, the arrangement is often frag-
ile. It is disturbed by a remarriage, a move, or simply the child's (or the par-
ents') tiring of all the shuttling.181
174. See, eg., Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Gant v. Gant, 329
S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985).
175. Minton, Evaluating the Homemaker's Services, in DIVORCE MATH (1982); Lambert, How
Much is a Good Wife Worth, 41 B.U.L. REv. 328 (1961).
176. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS
COPE wrrH DIVORCE 10 (1980) ("overwhelming majority [of children] preferred the unhappy mar-
riage to the divorce"); Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MicH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
177. When custodial mothers remarry, the percentage of noncustodial fathers having weekly
contact with their children was half of what it was when the custodial mothers remained unmarried
(14% to 29%). Fox, Noncustodial Fathers, in DIMENSIONS OF FATHERHOOD 403 (S. Hanson & F.
Bozett eds. 1985).
178. See, eg., Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984) (transcontinental move); Al-
drich v. Aldrich, 130 A.D.2d 917, 516 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1987) (permitting transcontinental move; relo-
cation to new spouse's place of employment constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying
disruption of noncustodial parent-child relationship); see Fox, supra note 176, at 404 ("Proximity is
also a factor in the probability of weekly contact between children and their noncustodial fathers.
When the father lived within an hour of the children, 31% had weekly contact; when he lived more
than an hour away, only 16% had weekly contact.").
179. Winebright v. Winebright, 155 Ill. App. 3d 722, 508 N.E.2d 774 (1987) (permitting move
out of state despite joint custody and extensive involvement by both parents in children's lives as
long as quality of life of custodial parent and children is improved); Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d
269 (Minn. 1983) (permitting parent with sole physical custody under joint custody decree to relo-
cate absent showing that relocation not in best interests of child).
180. A. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES § 5.07, at 57 (1983).
181. Among a group of divorced parents highly motivated toward joint physical custody, Stein-
man was "surprised to find" in follow-up interviews that within twelve to eighteen months:
one-third of the families had shifted to an arrangement in which their children lived pri-
marily in one home .... The major events that precipitated the shift from a dual-home to a
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Custody disputes between divorcing parents are decided under the rubric of
"the best interests of the child," a well-intentioned but notoriously indetermi-
nate standard for decisionmaking. 182 Because of its indeterminacy and the mo-
mentousness of the decision, the attraction of categorical rules and presumptions
is great. For the greater part of this century the maternal preference reigned
until its power was eliminated or diminished under the pressure of the Supreme
Court's gender-discrimination cases. 183 With the maternal preference under a
constitutional cloud, the primary caretaker rule has arisen. 184 This test categor-
ically prefers the parent who "has taken primary responsibility fbr.., the per-
formance of the [various] caring and nurturing duties of a parent."'185 Indeed,
even without the formality of a named presumption or preference, courts prefer
the parent who is the primary caretaker.
18 6
Two principal justifications exist for the use of the primary caretaker pre-
sumption. One is the elimination of strategic behavior in divorce negotia-
tions. 187 The contention is that the parent who is not the primary caretaker and
who does not really want custody of the children will, for negotiating leverage
on the financial issues, claim that she wants custody and is willing to engage in a
custody battle.' 88 To be sure, fair bargaining is a worthwhile goal, but the cost
of the presumption is high since it requires the categorical denial of genuine
custody claims by nonprimary caretakers.
The other principal justification of the primary caretaker presumption is
that granting custody to this person is in the best interests of the child. 189 Pro-
primary-home arrangement were: a geographical move; remarriage and a new baby (we
were surprised to find that remarriage alone did not seem to have an effect); and entry of
the child into adolescence.
Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legis-
lative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 739, 748 (1983).
182. See Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1987); Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226. Joseph Goldstein and his coauthors have sug-
gested that "a judicially supervised drawing of lots between two equally acceptable psychological
parents might be the most rational and least offensive process for resolving the hard choice." J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 175 n.12
(1979) [hereinafter BEYOND BIC]. This suggestion was reiterated in a later book, J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 24 & 68 (1986)
[hereinafter IN BIC].
183. See Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (maternal preference unconstitutional
even if only a rebuttable factual presumption). But the maternal preference has not been eliminated.
See Leisge v. Leisge, 223 Va. 688, 292 S.E.2d 352 (1982) (award of custody to suicidal mother not
found to be unfit rather than to excellent father was proper). For a general discussion of the contin-
ued use of the maternal preference, see Annotation, Modern Status of Maternal Preference Rule or
Presumption in Child Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R.3D 262 (1976).
184. See Derby and Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 571 P.2d 562, modified on oiher grounds, 31 Or.
App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). See generally
Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child,
41 A.L.R.4TH 1129 (1985) (factors to be considered as part of primary caretaker rule and compari-
son of its use in different jurisdictions).
185. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
186. See id. at 361.
187. Id. at 360-62.
188. Id. at 362 (discussing "Solomon syndrome," namely, the parent most attached to the child
will be most willing to accept an inferior bargain).
189. IN BIC, supra note 181, at 66-67, Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 361.
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ponents of this position maintain that if the best interests test is to be something
other than judicial crystal ball gazing, the sights must be focused on stability and
continuity. 190 Thus, assuming the primary caretaker is fit, custody should be
awarded to her because she represents stability and continuity.
The categorical position that because a person has been the primary care-
taker in an ongoing marriage that person should receive custody should be re-
jected. Assumption of the primary caretaker duties was a division of labor
worked out by the couple for their intact family life. To the extent the primary
caretaker presumption suggests that the primary caretaker is more concerned
about the children and is thereby the worthier claimant, the presumption is in-
sensitive to the pressures that impose specialization on spouses. One spouse may
have been the primary caretaker simply because it is traditional for women to be
primary caretakers. Another related reason is that because men are paid better,
the couple rationally chose to maximize the return on the expenditure of their
labor power by having the man specialize in income-producing labor and the
woman in nonincome-producing labor.19 1 Just as it is inequitable to say to the
woman at the time of divorce, "It was your decision to prefer the domestic
sphere to the marketplace; now you must live with the consequences," it is like-
wise inequitable to say to the man, "It was your decision to prefer the market-
place to the domestic sphere; now you must live with the consequences."' 192 The
allocation of their resources is a decision for which the spouses are jointly re-
sponsible, whether or not their decision was a highly reflective, liberated one or
an unreflective, customary one tacitly affirming the traditional wisdom of their
culture. 193
Proponents of the best interests test, or the more specific primary caretaker
presumption, justify the test on the basis of the exclusive goal of maximizing the
children's welfare.1 94 In common speech, the children should be hurt as little as
possible by the divorce. These proponents acknowledge that the loss of contact
with the children may be a great cost to the noncustodial parent, but ultimately
that parent's interests are accorded no weight in the decision making process. 195
190. BEYOND BIC, supra note 181, at 49-52; Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 361.
191. See G. BECKER, supra note 24, ch. 2 ("Division of Labor in Households and Families"); P.
BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 159-60 (1983) (women happier and relation-
ships more stable when male partners ambitious and successful); Moen & Dempster-McClain, supra
note 33. I am not maintaining that specialization is preferable to an equal sharing of the various
roles involved in domestic and market production. My point is that specialization is a rational
choice made for the good of the community (the family). Once that community is disbanded, the
choices made on the basis of the marriage should not bind the individuals.
192. Moen & Dempster-McClain, supra note 33, at 588 ("[O]ver half of mothers and almost
two-thirds of fathers say that they would prefer to work fewer hours per week in order 'to spend
more time with their spouse and children.' ").
193. Moen & Dempster-McClain, supra note 33, at 585 ("Considering the existing occupational
structure and conventional gender roles (i.e., for men, higher potential and real earnings, greater
emphasis on vertical career development, and greater stigma attached to withdrawal from labor
force), fathers preferring less work involvement have few options.").
194. BEYOND BIC, supra note 181, at 53.
195. BEYOND BIC, supra note 181, at 37-38, 108-11.
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For example, in Derby and Derby,1 96 custody was awarded to the mother be-
cause she was the primary caretaker, even though the father both "played the
traditional role of breadwinner" and "dedicated much time and attention to the
children ... .-"197 Indeed, Goldstein and his coauthors, in focusing exclusively
on the best interests of the child, wind up rejecting even visitation rights for the
noncustodial parent.198
Courts have not adopted the Goldstein view on visitation, thus recognizing
that parents do have a right to be with their children and that that right must be
taken into account even though subordinated to the best interests of the child. I
would extend the notion of parental right to the custody decision as well. The
goal should be the maximization of the sum of the welfare of the children and
the welfare of the divorced parent, unless it can be shown that the children's
welfare undergoes a very substantial deterioration under the latter approach.
Although the spouse who breaks up the family by divorce also suffers a loss in
not having daily contact with the children, that is a loss she has consented to
bear.
Certainly the rational divorcing spouse takes into account the potential loss
of the children to herself in deciding whether to proceed with divorce.1 9 9 But
the cost of the loss of the children to the divorced spouse may not be taken into
account or may actually be perceived by the divorcing spouse as a benefit, due to
spite, or reverse altruism. By the terms of the Model Agreement, the spouses
require that the divorcing spouse take account of the loss of the children by
placing that risk on the divorcing spouse except when divorce is justified because
of a serious marital fault.
The cost of losing the children can be brought home to the spouses through
the use of a contractual provision that provides: "The divorced spouse will re-
ceive sole legal and physical custody of the children unless it can be shown by
clear and convincing evidence that such placement is seriously detrimental to
the children. ' ' 2° ° Such a provision may reflect a more accurate conception of
the family than that implied by the present regime of unilateral no-fault divorce,
with its emphasis on individual spousal freedom. A traditional view of marriage
is that it is child-centered. 20 1 Although that view has been criticized as neglect-
196. 31 Or. App. 803, 571 P.2d 562, modifiedon other grounds, 31 Or. App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080
(1977).
197. Id. at 806-07, 571 P.2d at 564.
198. BEYOND BIC, supra note 181, at 38. This is not to say that there is no benefit to the child
from visitation with the noncustodial parent. Goldstein, In Whose Best Interest?, in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 48 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
199. Of course, it is possible that the loss of the children involves no cost to the divorcing spouse
or is even perceived as a benefit, but the point remains that the probable cost or benefit enters into
the divorcing spouse's utility calculation.
200. See Model Agreement para. 6(1).
201. See R. BRIFFAULT & B. MALINOWSKI, MARRIAGE: PAST AND PRESENT 50 (1956) (es-
sence of marriage not intimacy but "parenthood and above all maternity"). This is, for example, the
official view of the Catholic Church, as illustrated by several major pronouncements on marriage
made in the twentieth century.
And finally this [conjugal] love is fecund for it is not exhausted by the communion between
husband and wife, but is destined to continue, raising up new lives. "Marriage and conju-
gal love are by their nature ordained toward the begetting and educating of children. Chil-
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ing the significance of spousal love, it is arguable that the former imbalance has
been too vigorously redressed. While the spouses may agree that each would be
happier living apart from the other, if that were all there were to consider, one of
the spouses may prefer that the family remain together not precisely for the sake
of the children but for the sake of maintaining her everyday relationhip with the
children. That desire is entitled to substantial respect. As a matter of general
law, it may be preferable not to restrict divorce because of the possibility that the
spouses will have children, or to establish a separate marital regime for spouses
with minor children.20 2 However, the preference for spousal freedom to divorce
does not so obviously outweigh the interest in keeping the family intact that the
state should preclude persons from reaching an agreement, even prior to mar-
riage, regarding custody of children upon divorce.
Thus, the provision of the Model Agreement precludes even a spouse who
would otherwise be fairly confident of obtaining custody of the children-a full-
time mother-from obtaining custody in a pure unilateral no-fault divorce. This
person could seek to have the court declare the custody provision unenforceable
and of no weight, either in a predivorce action for a declaratory judgment or
simply in the divorce action itself. Her argument would be that the agreement
unduly burdens her statutory right to a unilateral no-fault divorce. The court,
she would maintain, may not be precluded from considering the best interests of
the child by an agreement between the spouses.
The theory behind the Model Agreement, however, does not disregard the
best interests of the child in favor of a parental right theory. It simply rejects a
hyper-refinement like the primary caregiver approach when the cost is noncon-
sensual deprivation of a psychological parent's daily contact with her children.
Professor Goldstein, when confronted with the situation of a parent who was not
actually caring for his child on an hour-to-hour basis, asserted the continuity
essential to the psychological parent-child relationship was defined by the child's
expectation that the psychological parent would be there for the child day after
day, night after night, but not necessarily hour after hour.20 3 In my view, it is
dren are really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute very substantially to the welfare
of their parents."
Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Humanae Vitae (July 25, 1968), in OFFICIAL CATHOLIC TEACHINGS:
LOVE AND SEXUALrrY 335 (0. Liebard ed. 1978) [hereinafter OCT] (quoting Second Vatican Coun-
cil, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes (December 7, 1965) in OCT at 281). Gaudium et Spes
itself recognizes that "[m]arriage to be sure is not instituted solely for procreation," id. at 282;
however, it also states:
[W]hile not making the other purposes of matrimony of less account, the true practice of
conjugal love, and the whole meaning of the family life which results from it, have this aim:
that the couple be ready with stout hearts to cooperate with the love of the Creator and the
Savior, who through them will enlarge and enrich His own family day by day.
Parents should regard as their proper mission the task of transmitting human life and
educating those to whom it has been transmitted.
Id. at 281; see also Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Casti Connubii (December 31, 1930) in OCT 27-29
(emphasizing primacy of the begetting and raising of children in marital relation).
202. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Crit-
icism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. Rv. 45, 90 (1981) (proposing a "marriage for
minor children," which would be more difficult to terminate than a marriage of persons without
minor children).
203. "A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
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enough that someone is a psychological parent. He should not lose the custody
dispute because he is not the primary psychological parent.
A test that focuses exclusively on the best interests of the child is not so
clearly superior to a rule that maximizes a wider set of interests so that the
parties should be precluded from contracting into the latter rule. ]In addition, the
best interests of the children are probably served by having two active par-
ents,2°4 and to the extent that the rule deters pure unilateral no-fault divorce, it
fosters the best interests of the child. Second, the rule under the agreement is
constrained by a "satisficing," 205 if not maximizing, rule with respect to the
children's welfare; that is to say, the child's interest may be satisfied by placing
him with either parent provided that both are psychological parents, even
though only one is the primary caretaker.20 6 So long as the child's interests are
satisfied, one should prefer a rule that maximizes a wider group of interests.
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs." BEYOND BIC,
supra note 181, at 98. In testimony in a child custody case, Professor Goldstein emphasized that a
psychological parent is not necessarily the person who is giving the child minute-to-minute care:
Q: You have taken into consideration, I assume, in answering as you have, that Mr. Rose
[the father] will be by necessity away from the child during periods of time when he's going
to have to be on training at the school, and that during those periods of time, that he will
be under the care of a competent woman, or possibly even a babysitter at times, or some
child-care center. You realize that, do you not? A : Yes. I realize that no parent can spend
every minute with a child, and in fact, I think it probably would be detrimental to the well-
being of the child if every minute was spent with the child.
One of the things that we're talking about when we talk about psychological parent is
what is beginning to be internalized by the child about the outside world and its reliability.
That's how kids are able to go to school and go to nursery school and spend time away
from their parents; they begin to internalize the parent. The parent becomes a part of
them, because there's an experience that the child grows on of the parent always coming
back. And so the experience as you've described it that Jason [the child] has had, is that
his father is always coming back, even though he's out of the house from time to time.
And that he's there night after night after night, or day after day, even though it's not
every hour or every minute. So it's that inner strength that's being built, which permits a
child over time to develop the independence that we all want for each of our kids, to be
able to walk alone in the world, but that they're carrying within them, if the relationship
has been substantial, a rather substantial hunk of what their parents had to offer.
J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 409 (2d ed. 1985).
204. See Kelly, Examining Resistance to Joint Custody, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING 40-41 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
205. Cf. D. GAUTHIER, supra note 26, at 184. Gauthier defines satisficing as "set[ting] a thresh-
old level of fulfilment and choosting] the first course of action of those coming to mind that one
expects to meet this level." Id. I am using the term in a somewhat different context, as a constraint
on maximization. In this context, satisficing means that one particular component of the sum to be
maximized must be at or above some threshold in order for the maximization to be acceptable.
Thus, for example, if in one case the sum of the components A and B is 100, and in the other 80, the
first case would be preferable. However, if a satisficing threshold of 40 is set for the A component,
and if in the first case the sum is made up of 30 (A) and 70 (B), that result falls below the threshold
and is unacceptable. If in the second case, the sum (80) is made up of 40 (A) and 40 (B), it is
acceptable. In our context, the interests of the child must be "satisficed" if not maximized in order
for the disposition to be acceptable.
206. It is not reported that "incompetence in the primary caretaker role" presents "an initial
difficulty" for many noncustodial fathers. Fox, supra note 176, at 407. However, custodial fathers
"apparently experience little difficulty in taking on" homemaking activities although they are "gen-
erally not active in [such] activities before they become single parents." Hanson, Single Custodial
Fathers, in DIMENSIONS OF FATHERHOOD 374 (S. Hanson & F. Bozett eds. 1985) (citing Chang &
Deinard, Single Father Caretakers. Demographic Characteristics and Adjustment Processes, 52 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 236 (1982)).
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Thus, where there is an agreement between the parents regarding custody of
their children upon divorce, it should govern. 207
There is a rejoinder to this argument. The primary caretaker role also re-
flects the parties' agreement, but it is more than a paper agreement-it is the
arrangement that the parties actually put into practice. The antenuptial agree-
ment, on the other hand, merely reflects an arrangement the parties made before
they had any children. The agreement's principal purpose was its in terrorem
effect on the primary caretaker.
The primary caretaker arrangement, however, was put in place under the
conditions of the contract. The husband, let us say, can argue that the actual
division of labor developed by the couple was acceptable to him because the
agreement assured him it would not be held against him, that he would not lose
his children because he had agreed to his wife's being the primary caretaker.
This contractual approach is to some extent reminiscent of the fault ap-
proach of nineteenth century American custody law.20 8 Custody law has long
attempted to balance the good of the child with the rights and interests of the
parents. Thus, Bishop was able to say, "[T]he leading doctrine in awarding the
custody is to consult the good of the children, rather than the gratification of the
parents. '209 But blended with the good of the child was the superior right of the
innocent party.210 The rights of the innocent spouse had two foundations, gen-
erally thought to reinforce one another. First, a person who abused one domes-
tic relation was thought likely to abuse the other.211 Second, it was thought that
a person who was compelled to dissolve the marital relationship because of the
other spouse's wrong should not pay for that rightful act by losing custody of
the children.2 12 This fault approach is not entirely pass6. 2 13
The difference between the contractual approach and the fault approach is
that the latter purported to determine which parent was the better parent; its
chief function was in combatting the maternal preference rule.214 Thus,
although a mother would normally receive custody of her children, especially if
they were young, this might not be the case if she were shown to be adulter-
ous. 215 The contractual approach does not assume that the divorcing spouse or
207. Garska puts a great deal of emphasis on this point. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360-62. Gold-
stein and his coauthor express a preference for parental determination of custody: "This determina.
tion [Le., of who will be the custodial parent after separation] may be made either by agreement
between the divorcing parents or by the court in the event each claims custody." BEYOND BIC,
supra note 181, at 38 n.*. The parental determination seems to be one that is made at the time of
separation rather than prior to marriage, however.
208. 2 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 530 (1881).
209. Id. § 532, at 457.
210. Id. at 458.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979) (even without specific showing
of adverse effect on children, the open and continuing cohabitation of custodial parent justified
change in custody), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980); see Annotation, Award of Custody of Child to
Parent Against Whom Divorce is Decreed, 23 A.L.R.3D 6 (1969) (setting forth general principles of
the fault approach).
214. Annotation, supra note 212, § 2, at 16, 20-21.
215. Annotation, supra note 212, § 5, at 38-47.
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the divorced spouse, if shown to be at fault, is a worse parent than the other
spouse. It attempts to determine which of two fit psychological parents is the
more deserving parent to remain in daily contact with the children. The con-
tractual approach does not abandon the best interests of the child rule, because it
requires as a threshold that the custodial parent is a fit parent and a psychologi-
cal parent. It does, however, move in the direction of parental right, stating that
loss of daily contact with one's children is a cost that should be borne by the
spouse responsible for the breakup of the family.
Although the state has a strong interest in seeing that the best interests of
children are served, the state's ability to determine what is in the best interests of
the children is limited. To some extent, the use of the primary caretaker pre-
sumption indicates the state is satisfied that a categorical approach adequately
secures the interests of the child. The contractual approach does no more than
this. The court is not precluded from denying custody when it can be shown by
clear and convincing evidence that such placement is seriously detrimental to
the children. Thus, the spouse seeking a no-fault divorce would not receive cus-
tody of the children unless she can show by clear and convincing evidence that
the children would experience serious detriment unless they were placed with
her.
V. CONCLUSION
Antenuptial agreements restricting the right to divorce, directly or indi-
rectly, are based on two recent changes in the law. The first is the liberalization
of the divorce laws making pure unilateral no-fault divorce possible. Thus, one
spouse can terminate the marriage and leave the other significantly worse off,
especially with respect to job or career and to daily contact with the couple's
children. The second recent change is the validation of divorce planning in ante-
nuptial agreements. This change rests on a recognition of marriage as primarily
a private matter, albeit one with significant public consequences. Therefore,
marriage is a matter which may be privately regulated, and this regulatory
power can be used to counteract the adverse consequences of the liberal modem
divorce law. What is unresolved is the permissible extent of private regulation-
more specifically, whether it extends to direct or indirect restrictions on the right
of divorce.
To the extent that marriage is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage,
it is suitable to the analysis of rational choice, which has played a significant role
in moral philosophy in recent years. This philosophical literature maintains that
it is in one's rational self-interest to constrain one's freedom in order to protect
cooperation, which, if mutual, will generate greater benefits for all than will indi-
vidual maximizing by each person. Constraints are necessary to deter and/or
compensate for betrayals of the cooperative venture by its members. Because
members do not cease to be individualistic utilitarians upon entering into the
cooperative venture, but enter it precisely because they are individualistic utili-
tarians, the possibility remains that a member may behave selfishly, either be-
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cause she is able to seize for herself the fruits of cooperation or because she has a
better option outside the venture.
An antenuptial agreement restricting divorce would use two familiar legal
mechanisms: a bar to divorce and burdens imposed on the decision to divorce,
such as unfavorable divisions of property and future income and unfavorable
custody awards. Both these mechanisms would be subject to challenges under
constitutional and contract law. Regarding the constitutional challenge,
although some legal scholars have argued for a constitutional right to pure uni-
lateral no-fault divorce, an analysis of the Supreme Court's recent marriage and
divorce cases indicates that such a position is unwarranted. The Model Agree-
ment, therefore, should withstand a constitutional challenge.
A challenge under contract law is more problematic. There are only two
appellate cases dealing with anything resembling the Model Agreement; both are
readily distinguishable. In Towles, the bar was limited to the wife and was abso-
lute; in Sanders, a burden approach was used that applied to both spouses, but
the burden was forfeiture of all marital property, which also was absolute. Be-
cause Towles and Sanders do not provide much guidance, this Article examined
cases from analogous areas of contract law. These cases do cast doubt on the
validity of barring divorce, even if only on a limited basis. Covenants not to sue
in negligence are generally held valid; the covenant not to sue for divorce is
analogous in that it does not purport to bar divorce absolutely in the event of
marital fault. However, other areas of contract law, specifically those dealing
with partnerships for a term and negative covenants in personal service con-
tracts, place a high value on individual freedom and the power to terminate
these close relationships at will. On the other hand, the traditional recognition
of the marital partnership as having a strong legal bond, together with the avail-
ability of more weakly bonded relationships such as unmarried cohabitation and
marriage with unilateral no-fault divorce, provides, in a liberal, pluralistic soci-
ety, a basis in principle for specifically enforcing the bar.
The use of financial deterrents on divorce is less problematic than barring
divorce. Posner and its progeny accept divorce planning in antenuptial agree-
ments that leaves one spouse in a worse position than she would be were the
agreement disregarded. One post-Posner case, Noghrey, dealt with a situation in
which one spouse would have profited under an antenuptial agreement from
divorcing the other. The court invalidated the agreement. However, the Model
Agreement does the opposite: the divorcing spouse, whether or not she is the
wealthier, suffers financially from the divorce. The unequal distribution pro-
vided in the Model Agreement is justified as liquidated damages for the losses
divorce imposes on the divorced spouse, rather than as a penalty on the other.
Further, because the Model Agreement also favors a spouse who can show mari-
tal fault on the part of the other, goading is deterred because the goader may be
found to have been cruel under the terms of the agreement.
Finally, and most controversially, the Model Agreement generally denies
child custody to the spouse who obtains a unilateral no-fault divorce. Custody is
awarded to the divorced spouse unless the divorcing spouse either can show the
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divorced spouse to be at fault or can show by clear and convincing evidence that
placement with the divorced spouse would be seriously detrimental to the chil-
dren. This approach is consistent with the best interests of the child standard if
that standard is interpreted so as not to discriminate between psychological par-
ents. Under this view, the best interests of the child test requires only that the
child be placed with a psychological parent. It does not require that a court
determine which parent is the primary caretaker or that the court undertake an
extensive, and arguably discredited, search for the best once it has determined
who the psychological parents are. The approach embodied in the Model
Agreement maximizes the sum of the welfare of the children and the divorced
spouse, while "satisficing" the welfare of the children. It is based on the position
that the parent-child relationship is as significant as the interspousal relationship
and that the former relationship, which suffers substantial damage when a per-
son becomes a noncustodial parent, should not be put at the risk of a pure uni-
lateral no-fault divorce. Unless the spouse who desires to break up the family
has good cause by showing marital fault on the part of her spouse, she should
not have the power to virtually terminate the other's relationship with the
children.
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APPENDIX. A MODEL AGREEMENT: TEXT AND COMMENTARY
1. The parties take seriously the traditional commitment of per-
sons to remain married to one another until they are separated by
death, and they wish to bind themselves legally to that commitment.
2. They realize that they cannot know the future, and they are
aware that strains and differences may develop between them, but they
trust that each will attempt to resolve any such strains and difficulties
that may arise. Such attempts may be made either between themselves
or with the assistance of others.
3. They reject divorce as a means of resolving marital differences
and strains, except in very limited circumstances (see paragraph 7
below).
4. Therefore, they agree that neither shall seek a divorce on the
grounds of a period of separation, or on the grounds of incompatibility,
or on the ground that their marriage is irretrievably or irremediably
broken, or on any other ground unless the other spouse is guilty of
abandonment, adultery, or cruelty as defined in paragraph 11 below.
Comment. A more stringent alternative to the Model Agreement's limitation of
the right of divorce is a complete bar. Roman Catholics, for example, who want
civilly to replicate the Church's strictures on divorce could choose to bar divorce
absolutely. Absolute bars to divorce are ill-advised, however. First, they seem
very imprudent. It makes no sense (to me, at any rate) for a spouse who has
been abandoned or who is the victim of spousal battery to be contractually
barred from obtaining a divorce. 216 Another reason that absolute bars are ill
advised is that they are much more likely to be held void as against public policy
than are limited bars, such as bars limited to no-fault divorce.
A difficult problem of interpretation arises with the use of the term "cru-
elty." In the era of fault divorce, that term had a wide range of meanings. 217
Cruelty ranged all the way from severe beating at one end of the spectrum to
mere incompatibility at the other-as in a spouse who does not take a sufficient
interest, in the other spouse's opinion, in the other's work or leisure activities. 2 18
If cruelty is interpreted so broadly as to include incompatibility, we have virtu-
ally reentered the realm of unilateral no-fault divorce. It will be necessary, then,
to interpret the term cruelty restrictively. Such an interpretation is implicitly
called for simply by the context. Because the purpose of the agreement is to
216. Adultery has long been a fault ground for divorce. Although it retains in some states a
special place among marital faults, it seems to me that unless the adultery amounts to abandonment
or cruelty, it is not the kind of fault, like battery, that is inconsistent with a spousal relationship. Of
course, the victim spouse can always choose not to obtain a divorce even if she has grounds. As for
the adulterer, she is aware that adultery has long been considered a serious marital offense and
should not be surprised if the other spouse seeks a divorce on that ground. The parties, may, how-
ever, choose not to make adultery one of the grounds that permit a spouse to obtain a divorce.
217. H. CLARK, supra note 6, § 12.4, at 341-44.
218. Compare Rios v. Rios, 34 A.D.2d 325, 311 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1970) (requiring pattern of actual
violence or conduct such as seriously affects the health of the spouse and threatens to impair it and
renders it unsafe to cohabit), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 840, 277 N.E.2d 786, 327 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971) with
Barngrover v. Barngrover, 57 Cal. App. 43, 206 P. 461 (1922) (mental cruelty consisting of persis-
tent nagging).
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reject the availability of unilateral no-fault divorce to the parties, it would be
inconsistent with that purpose to interpret cruelty so broadly that it meant noth-
ing more than incompatibility. This point is emphasized by paragraph 9, which
provides that failure to resolve or even attempt to resolve marital difficulties is
not a ground for divorce. In other words, cruelty cannot be interpreted so
broadly as to cover this situation.
On the other hand, how restrictive should the cruelty ground be? Should it
be limited to battery? There is support in the case law for such a limitation,
especially when the state provided for no-fault divorce as well.2 19 There are two
explanations for such a narrow interpretation in those situations. First, the leg-
islature may have intended the narrow interpretation because of the conceptual
contrast with a no-fault divorce provision. Second, because the parties have a
no-fault exit from marriage, the court can afford to deny divorce on the cruelty
ground because the spouses are not locked into an unhappy marriage. In our
situation, of course, by limiting the coverage of cruelty, the court is locking the
parties into a marriage in which one of them, at least, is unhappy.
The cruelty provision should be elaborated to state "cruel and wanton con-
duct calculated to inflict suffering. A showing of spousal incompatibility or that
the marriage is irretrievably or irremediably broken does not satisfy this defini-
tion." The goal of this provision is to permit a spouse who is actually the victim
of spousal abuse, either mental or physical, to obtain a divorce without suffering
the forfeitures stated in the agreement. Of course, this provision is not fool-
proof. A judge could "interpret" this provision to be the functional equivalent
of unilateral no-fault divorce. The fundamental goal of the agreement remains,
however; namely, to contract out of the regime of unilateral no-fault divorce.
5. Should either party seek a divorce, this agreement shall bar
the party from being granted such a divorce unless the divorcing
spouse is able to show that the divorced spouse is guilty of abandon-
ment, adultery, or cruelty.
6. Except as provided in paragraph 7, should either spouse ob-
tain a unilateral no-fault divorce, all of the following provisions shall
be enforced. [Subsections set out below]
Comment. Bar (paragraph 5) and burdens (paragraph 6) may be used in
the alternative or in conjunction. The bar is the stronger approach, but it may
not be effective. Even assuming the state in which the spouses are domiciled
would uphold the agreement, other states may not. The history of divorce mills
in the United States suggests that some states may not give any effect to the
agreement. Since a state in which a person is domiciled can grant a divorce that
will have nation-wide effect,220 the bar provision is vulnerable to a spouse's mov-
ing to a more receptive jurisidiction.
The burdens approach, although nominally weaker, is not vulnerable to a
migratory divorce, since a state must have personal jurisdiction over both
219. See Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406, 308 N.E.2d 891, 353 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1974).
220. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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spouses in order to adjudicate property and support matters22 1 and jurisdiction
over the children in order to decide child custody.222 Assuming that the state
which had been the spouses' matrimonial domicile would uphold the agreement,
a spouse cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement by forum shopping. Thus the
"burdens" approach has the higher probability of being efficacious. At the same
time, if the burdens do not have a deterrent effect, a spouse may wish to have the
bar provisions to block divorce.
(1) The divorced spouse shall receive sole legal and physical cus-
tody of the children unless it can be shown by clear and convincing
evidence that such placement is seriously detrimental to the children.
Comment. This provision favors the divorced spouse (or the divorcing
spouse under paragraph 8) by giving custody to the parent who has not dis-
solved the marriage. It provides, in effect, that even a primary caretaker cannot
deprive the other parent of daily contact with his or her children unless that
other parent has caused the dissolution of the marriage through his or her
fault.2 2 3
(2) The spouses' property shall be divided as follows:
(a) The divorced spouse shall receive 50% of that portion
of the net value of the divorcing spouse's commercial or professional
goodwill, licenses, or degrees developed or earned during their
marriage.
(b) The divorcing spouse shall receive none of the value of
the divorced spouse's commercial or professional goodwill, licenses, or
degrees.
(c) Regarding the remainder of the spouses' property, the
divorced spouse shall receive 75% of the net value of the spouses'
property (including marital property and the divorcing spouse's sepa-
rate property) with a net value up to twice the family's annual income.
In this regard, marital property shall be exhausted before the divorcing
spouse's separate property is divided. The parties shall equally divide
the-net value of marital property with a net value greater than twice
the family's annual income.
(d) Normally the family's annual income shall be deter-
mined by its actual income over the twelve months immediately prior
to divorce. If that amount is abnormally high or low, the family's an-
nual income shall be determined by what would have been normal in-
come for the family during that period. The spouses can determine
what was normal either by agreement between themselves or by an
arbitrator.
(e) If there are liquidity problems, they shall be resolved by
agreement between the spouses or by an arbitrator.
221. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
222. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); UNIF. CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT § 3 (adopted, with some variations, in all states).
223. See supra text accompanying note 183-214.
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(f) The divorcing spouse shall have no right to any of the
separate property of the divorced spouse.
Comment. Because the parties may not know at the beginning of their mar-
riage what their wealth will be at the time of separation or divorce, should one of
them decide to separate or divorce, nor do they know what impact inflation will
have on the value of a dollar, it is sensible to draft this provision using percent-
ages rather than dollars.
The agreement adopts the view that human capital, in the form of commer-
cial or professional goodwill, licenses, or degrees, is a family asset and thus
should be divided between the spouses.224 Under the agreement, the present
value of the asset is divided equally. The asset is not valued at the annual in-
come of the asset-holder, but only at the portion of that income attributable to
the asset.2 2 5 Moreover, if the asset was developed prior to marriage, that portion
of the value of the asset attributable to such premarital development is viewed as
an individual rather than a family asset and thus is not subject to division.226
The agreement divides the other property in a manner that favors the di-
vorced spouse (or the divorcing spouse when the other is guilty of abandonment,
adultery, or cruelty), but, unlike the Sanders' agreeement,2 27 it stops short of
giving all the spouses' property to the favored spouse. In some situations, such a
remedy might be out of line with the needs of the divorced spouse and result in a
draconian penalty, whose doubtful enforceability might render the entire provi-
sion, perhaps the entire contract, unenforceable.
I have further sought to avoid a punitive distribution of property by linking
the unequal division to the annual income of the parties. Thus, the property
subject to distribution is distributed unequally (75%-25%) only up to the point
at which it is equal to twice the family's annual income. Thereafter, it is divided
equally. A study by Weitzman shows that for lower income families, net assets
were less than annual income.2 28 It was only in groups in which the family's
income exceeded $30,000 that the median value of net assets exceeded the me-
dian income. Thus, for lower income families, the divorced spouse will probably
receive 75% of all property; as the income level increases the probability in-
creases that the twice-annual-income cap on unequal distribution will be
reached.
Thus if a family had annual income of $40,000 and property with a net
worth of $100,000, the divorced spouse would receive $70,000, consisitng of
75% of the first $80,000 (i.e., $60,000), and half of the remaining $20,000 (i.e.,
$10,000). Thus the divorced spouse would receive 70% of the spouses' property
224. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985); Kraus-
kopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in
Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980).
225. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749; Haugan v. Haugan,
117 Wis. 2d 200, 213-15, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984); Krauskopf, supra note 223, at 382-84.
226. This is simply an extension of the familiar source-of-funds approach used to divide property
that is both separate and marital. See Krauskopf, Principles of Property Distribution, in 3 FAMILY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 37.08[3][b] (A. Rutkin ed. 1987) ("Source of Funds Theory").
227. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
228. Weitzman, supra note 41, at 1192-93.
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not counting her own separate property, which would not be subject to division.
If the family had the same income but $200,000 in marital property, the di-
vorced spouse's share of the total would fall to 60% because she would receive
only half of the second $100,000 thereby giving her a total of $120,000.
There is nothing scientific about the numbers-either the 75%-25% divi-
sion or using twice the annual income as a break point. I chose round numbers
to roughly compensate the divorced spouse for losses resulting from divorce and
thus deter the divorcing spouse, but not do more than that- that is, not punish
the divorcing spouse. Arguably, the break point should be equal to the annual
income or to something more than twice the annual income. The line I have
drawn attempts to take into account that the lower the amount of property the
more painful its loss. In this manner the distribution substantially favors the
divorced spouse until a point is reached at which the accumulated property sub-
stantially exceeds the annual income.
Both the separate property of the divorcing spouse and the marital property
are available for distribution up to the amount of twice the annual income.
Thereafter, separate property is distributed entirely to the spouse whose separate
property it is, whether or not she is the divorcing spouse. Only if the marital
property exceeds twice the annual income will that excess amount be distrib-
uted, and it will be distributed equally. The divorcing spouse's separate property
is made subject to distribution on the belief that the family has a strong claim to
even the separate property of either spouse at lower levels of accumulation-that
is, where the spousal property, including marital property, is less than twice the
annual income.
Special situations (paragraph 6(2)(d)). A classic situation in which the last
year's income would not be the proper standard would be one in which the
divorcing spouse intentionally depresses her income. 229 Another situation
might be one in which the divorced spouse ceases earning income in order to be
at home with the children.230 In either situation, it may be fairer to choose
another number as the family's normal annual income rather than the family's
actual income in the year preceding divorce.
(3) The divorced spouse shall receive as much of the income of
the divorcing spouse, from whatever source, as is necessary for the di-
vorced spouse to receive at least 60% of the total income, earned and
unearned, of the two spouses. This right shall continue until the di-
vorced spouse either remarries or forms an intimate association with
another person and cohabits with that person.
If at any time there is a substantial decrease in the income of
either former spouse, the other may seek arbitration to determine
whether payments should be based on earning capacity rather than on
actual income.
229. See, e.g., Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917 (S.D. 1981); Ward v. Ward, 50 So. 2d 477
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (voluntary early retirement).
230. Cf. Bender v. Bender, 297 Pa. Super. 461, 444 A.2d 124 (1982) (courts should consider a
parent's desire to stay home to "nurture" children in determining whether wife should be relieved of
contributing to child's monetary support).
[Vol. 66
CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS ON DIVORCE
Comment. This provision works as follows. Let us assume that each
spouse earns $500 per week. The total income of the spouses is $1000 per week.
The divorced spouse is entitled to 60% of that amount, or $600, which would
mean that the divorcing spouse would transfer $100 per week to the divorced
spouse. If either spouse's income dropped to $300 per week, the total income
would drop to $800. Sixty percent of $800 is $480. If it was the divorcing
spouse's income that dropped, she would owe the divorced spouse nothing be-
cause she was already bringing in $500, which is more than 60% of the total.
On the other hand, if it was the divorced spouse's income that dropped to $300 a
week, the divorcing spouse would have to transfer $180 a week in order for the
divorced spouse to receive $480, or 60% of the total.
In both cases, there may be cause for complaint. Either the divorced
spouse's weekly income drops substantially-from $ 600 to $480--or the divorc-
ing spouse's weekly support increases substantially-from $100 to $180. This
matter would need to be resolved if it arose either by an arbitrator or by negotia-
tions in the shadow of such a third party decision.
(4) Child support shall be determined at the time of divorce
either by agreement between the spouses or by an arbitrator. Such
support may be revised from time to time on the basis of changed
circumstance.
(a) Support shall be based on the needs of the children and
the relative abilities of the parents to pay after the payments under
paragraph 6(3) have been made.
(b) Neither the spouses' remarriage to other persons nor
their having additional children, whether stepchildren, adopted chil-
dren, or biological children, marital or nonmarital, shall be a factor in
determining her ability to provide child support.
Comment. This agreement does not attempt to set child support prior to
marriage. 23 1 It does, however, seek to prevent former spouses from obtaining
judicial downward modification of child support obligations because of new
families.23 2
7. Abandonment, adultery, and cruelty (each as defined in para-
graph 11 below) shall constitute a breach of this agreement, and the
party who is a victim of such act or acts may seek and obtain a divorce
(either a divorce from bed and board or an absolute divorce) on the
grounds available to him or her under the applicable state law
(whether fault or no-fault grounds). The party who is guilty of aban-
donment, adultery, or cruelty is not thereby released from this agree-
ment, and the agreement shall continue to be a complete bar to his or
her obtaining a divorce.
231. See In re Marriage of Ayo, 190 Cal. App. 3d 442, 235 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1987); Miesen v.
Frank, 361 Pa. Super. 204, 522 A.2d 85 (1987); UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(b) ("The
right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.").
232. See Lambert v. Miller, 358 S.E.2d 785, 790-91 (W. Va. 1987); Annotation, Remarriage of
Parent as Basis for Modification of Amount of Child Support Provisions of Divorce Decree, 89
A.L.R.2D 106 (1963).
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Comment. See Comment to paragraph 4.
8. A spouse who has not breached the agreement under para-
graph 7 and who obtains a divorce and has shown that the other
spouse has breached the agreement under paragraph 7 is entitled to the
benefits set out in paragraph 6.
Comment. When the divorcing spouse can show that the divorced spouse
was at fault, and the divorced spouse cannot show that the divorcing spouse was
at fault, the provisions of paragraph 6 are applied in favor of the divorcing
spouse rather than the divorced spouse.
9. The failure to resolve marital difficulties and the failure to at-
tempt to resolve any such difficulties shall not constitute a breach of
this agreement.
Comment. Thus, a failure to attempt to resolve marital difficulties does not
in itself amount to cruelty.
10. The parties reserve the power to rescind this agreement by
mutual agreement. Such agreement to rescind must be in writing,
signed and notarized.
Comment. The parties retain the right to rescind the contract and reenter
the state's unilateral no-fault divorce regime. In order to assure deliberation, the
contract requires signature and notarization.
11. Definitions:
(1) Abandonment-Physical separation from the other
spouse for one month with the intention to discontinue permanently
the marital cohabitation and without the consent of the other spouse.
(2) Adultery-Voluntary sexual intercourse, including sod-
omy, with a person other than one's spouse.
(3) Cruelty-Cruel and wanton conduct calculated to in-
flict suffering on the other spouse. A showing of spousal incompatibil-
ity or that the marriage is irretrievably or irremediably broken does
not satisfy this definition.
(4) Divorced spouse-The spouse other than the one filing
for divorce after the time of filing.
(5) Divorcing spouse-The spouse who files for divorce.
(6) Family's annual income-Earned and unearned of both
spouses regardless of whether the unearned income was from marital
or separate property.
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